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REACHING OUT TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY: CIVIL LAWSUITS AS THE 
COMMON GROUND IN THE BATTLE AGAINST 
TERRORISM 
DEBRA M. STRAUSS* 
“In a very real sense, the world no longer has a choice between 
force and law. If civilization is to survive, it must choose the rule of 
law.” 
 
— Dwight D. Eisenhower1 
INTRODUCTION 
At a time when fears of terrorism dominate the international 
community and support for military action has eroded, global security 
seems elusive but essential. Can it possibly be achieved in a way that 
will unify the nations without generating unintended negative 
consequences for all? Perhaps now more than ever, global security 
requires a novel approach to the problem of international terrorism.  
One of the goals of the United Nations (“UN”) is to foster the civil 
discourse among nations. Indeed, this article emphasizes using a 
civil—not military or retaliatory—approach to respond to matters of 
international terrorism and international trade. In that spirit, this 
article posits a nonmilitary battle, a civil approach to dealing with a 
problem that concerns us all. Moreover, the only anticipated side-
 
 * Debra Strauss is an Assistant Professor of Business Law at Fairfield University, Charles 
F. Dolan School of Business. She received her B.A. from Cornell University and her J.D. from 
Yale Law School. Professor Strauss teaches the legal environment of business, international law, 
and law and ethics. Her work has been cited by legal authorities and the courts in support of 
lawsuits against terrorist groups and state sponsors of international terrorism. A previous 
version of this paper was presented at the Oxford Round Table on Global Security at Oxford 
University, England, March 19, 2008. Copyright © 2009 Debra M. Strauss. All rights reserved. 
 1. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President on the Observance of 
Law Day (Apr. 30, 1958), DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER MEMORIAL COMMISSION, 
http://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:Y94vKYVU0mMJ:w-ww.eisenhowermemorial.org/speeche 
s/19580430%2520Statement%2520by%2520the%2520President%2520on%2520the%2520Obse
rvance%2520of%2520Law%2520Day.htm (in proclaiming the first “Law Day” as May 1st:  
“The reason is to remind us all that we as Americans live, every day of our lives, under a rule of 
law”). 
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effect will be a strengthening of, and increased universal respect for, 
the rule of law. 
A new type of lawsuit has emerged in the United States, in which 
victims of terrorism, individually or in groups, have pursued the 
perpetrators of terrorist acts and the organizations or nations who 
have enabled and funded them. Pursuant to several U.S. statutes—the 
Antiterrorism Act of 1991, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, the Torture Victim Protection Act, and the 
Alien Tort Claims Act— along with common law tort claims, such as 
aiding and abetting liability, plaintiff-victims not only deplete the 
assets of terrorist groups, but also prevent the means for future acts of 
terrorism.2 Combining these statutes maximizes the types of money 
damages and the range of defendants that can be held civilly 
accountable, including terrorist groups, officials, and other 
individuals, along with the foreign states, organizations, and agencies 
that sponsor them.3 
In deciding how to respond appropriately to international 
terrorism, a debate has generated four approaches.4 The first 
approach views terrorism as a crime which is subject to the rules, 
punishment, and procedural protections of the criminal justice 
system.5 The second approach considers the struggle to be a war on 
terrorism, invoking the rules and restraints provided by the 
 
 2. See generally Debra M. Strauss, Enlisting the U.S. Courts in a New Front: Dismantling 
the International Business Holdings of Terrorist Groups Through Federal Statutory and 
Common-Law Suits, 38 VAND.  J. TRANSNAT’L L. 679 (2005) (detailing the cases decided under 
several U.S. statutes – the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, the Torture Victim Protection Act, and the Alien Tort Claims Act). 
 3. Id. (proposing “an aggregate model for lawsuits by victims against terrorist groups, 
organizations, and state-sponsors of international terrorism, combining the claims, types of 
damages, and defendants accessible” under these federal statutes, as well as state common-law-
tort claims including aiding and abetting liability). 
 4. See Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information 
Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1026-27 (2007) (discussing the four approaches in 
the literature in his article comparing “information operations,” which is the use of information 
technology to disrupt a country’s infrastructure, to terrorism and proposing a new international 
legal framework to deal with this type of threat). 
 5. See, e.g., David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on 
Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 30 (2003) (proposing that safeguards of the criminal 
process be applied for terrorist acts); Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks 
on the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 325, 326-28 (2003) (arguing that claims of a U.S. “war” 
with al-Qaeda or terrorism carry dangerous implications for acts that should be treated as 
criminal); Leila Nadya Sadat, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV. 135, 140 (2004) (contending that, under the law of war, international terrorists are carrying 
out organized crime rather than “armed conflict”). 
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international law of war.6 The third theory utilizes both war and crime 
models as not mutually exclusive.7 Lastly, the fourth paradigm 
contends that terrorism fits neither model and should be treated 
under a new legal framework developed to respond most effectively.8  
This article considers civil actions as an alternative approach, and not 
necessarily an exclusive one. 
In Part I, this article reviews the U.S. law underlying some of the 
most recent cases by victims against terrorist groups, noting the 
difficulties that plaintiffs have encountered in collecting upon their 
judgments. Part II examines a new piece of legislation recently signed 
into law, referred to as the “Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 
2007.” This new law will correct several limitations in previously 
existing law, expanding these lawsuits and facilitating the collection of 
civil judgments for victims against terrorist states through subsidiary 
banks in the United States.9 The new law will produce even more of 
these judgments. These current developments illustrate how U.S. 
courts and legislators are doing their part in the civil battle against 
terrorism. 
 
 6. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the 
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2070-71 (2005) (arguing that the characterization of 
terrorist conflict as “war” by the political branches must be accepted by the courts); Ronald J. 
Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
307, 351-52 (2003) (suggesting a military approach be used to fight terrorism); John Yoo, Courts 
at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573, 577-79, 601 (2006) (portraying conflict with al-Qaeda as war); 
John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 207, 213 (2003) 
(rejecting the view that terrorism entails a “massive crime, rather than an act of war”). 
 7. See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, ‘Lesser Evils’ in the War on Terrorism, 36 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 335, 335-36 (2004) (supporting use of military means and criminal law to counter 
terrorism); Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 
457-58, 484-85 (2002) (rejecting “the binary character of the war/crime” paradigm and 
proposing both crime and war-related responses to terrorism); Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and 
the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 49 
(2002) (describing the events on September 11 “as both a criminal act and an armed attack”). 
 8. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871, 1873 (2004) 
(rejecting the war/crime dichotomy in favor of a third framework); Kenneth Anderson, U.S. 
Counterterrorism Policy and Superpower Compliance with International Human Rights Norms, 
30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 455, 476-77 (2007) (seeking new domestic legal regimes to deal with 
terrorism); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the 
Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 761 (2004) (suggesting a 
reconsideration of the law of armed conflict together with international human rights law as a 
new antiterrorism paradigm). 
 9. See generally Strauss, supra note 2 (analyzing the limitations of the U.S. statutes under 
which terrorism victims may pursue certain types of defendants as well as restrictions on 
punitive or treble damages). 
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As the judgments from these civil lawsuits build, the United 
States is on the way to combating terrorism through this novel and 
different—nonmilitary—approach, whereby one can compensate the 
victims of terrorism and at the same time potentially deplete the 
assets and financial support for future terrorist acts. In Part III, this 
article explores the economic perspective that underlies the 
effectiveness of this tactic and considers extending this successful 
approach to international organizations. An analysis of the UN 
resolutions that authorize the freezing of assets overseas 
demonstrates that the foundation has already been established. In 
view of the international community’s common goal of drying up the 
financial means for terrorism, it should build upon this foundation to 
strengthen and expand current initiatives. Part IV offers a proposal 
for a unified financial approach to eliminating the money for terrorist 
organizations that is clearly consistent with the public policy of the 
UN and its member nations. 
Finally, the article concludes that support from the international 
community could overcome problems in enforcing judgments and 
exercising jurisdiction. Reciprocity and respect for these decisions of 
U.S. courts at the international level would bring the global 
community together around the common goal of ending terrorism. 
Moreover, member nations could empower national and international 
courts to provide victims with the ability to pursue their claims and to 
access frozen assets overseas. Especially in view of the eroding 
support for military action, these nations and organizations could find 
common ground in bolstering these civil lawsuits and thereby 
promote the rule of law. 
I. A CIVIL APPROACH: LAWSUITS AS COMPENSATORY 
AND PREVENTATIVE 
As the civil approach to fighting terrorism has taken hold in the 
United States, individual plaintiffs have sought to vindicate their lost 
loved ones, punish and deter the terrorist actors, and disrupt the 
financial trail that could lead to further acts of terror. It is instructive 
first to highlight some of these cases authorized by U.S. law, and then 
address the obstacles these plaintiffs have encountered, both in the 
United States and abroad, in seeking to execute court judgments. A 
victory in name alone is not enough; one must remember that, in 
addition to compensating the victims and their families, the ultimate 
goal of these lawsuits is to access and drain terrorist funds. 
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A. Recent U.S. Cases and Judgments Obtained 
Following most if not all of the terrorist acts perpetrated upon 
U.S. citizens, the victims and/or their families have sought redress in 
court, sometimes many years later, against the terrorists and those 
individuals, organizations and nations that supported and enabled 
them, particularly through funding. In the United States, victims of 
international terrorism and their families have successfully pursued 
lawsuits under the Antiterrorism Act of 1991 (“ATA”),10 the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”),11 the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”),12 the 
Alien Torts Claims Act (“ATCA”),13 and combinations of these 
federal statutes, as well as state common-law tort claims including 
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, battery, 
assault, wrongful death, survival, false imprisonment, loss of 
consortium, solatium, and aiding and abetting liability.14 For each of 
these causes of action, the courts have interpreted limits in the types 
of claims, defendants, and/or damages that can be recovered.15 
The ATA provides that any U.S. citizen injured “by reason of an 
act of international terrorism,” or his or her surviving heir, may sue in 
the appropriate U.S. district court for “threefold the damages he or 
she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.”16  
Courts have noted that the provision of treble damages precludes the 
possibility of punitive damages.17 The ATA makes it a crime to 
provide material support to terrorists and provides jurisdictional tools 
 
 10. Antiterrorism Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-572, §1003, 106 Stat. 4522 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-38 (2006)). 
 11. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 21, 28, 42 U.S.C.). 
 12. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)). 
 13. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 14. For an example of a case that combines these claims, see generally Burnett v. Al Baraka 
Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2003) (involving a large civil action in which 
more than two thousand victims and their families seek to hold accountable the persons and 
international entities that funded and supported al Qaeda in perpetrating the 9/11 World Trade 
Center tragedy). 
 15. See generally Strauss, supra note 2 (analyzing in detail these causes of action and cases 
decided under each). 
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006). 
 17. See, e.g., Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). See also Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 304 F. Supp. 2d 232, 239 
(D.R.I. 2004) (declining to allow prejudgment interest on the same reasoning that treble 
damages provided the exclusive penalty). 
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to enable lawsuits.18 However, a 1992 amendment bars any actions 
under the ATA against a foreign state, an agency of a foreign state, or 
an officer or employee of a foreign state acting within his or her 
official capacity.19 
In turn, section 1605(a)(7) of the AEDPA waives sovereign 
immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) in 
cases that seek money damages for 
personal injury or death that was caused by torture, extrajudicial 
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of 
material  support or resources (as defined in section 2339A of title 
18 [of the ATA]) for such an act if such act or provision of material 
support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such 
foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, 
employment, or agency.20 
The 1996 Flatow Amendment extended this statute expressly to 
create a cause of action against the officials, employees, and agents of 
state sponsors of terrorism “for money damages which may include 
economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive 
damages.”21 By its terms, actions under the AEDPA are limited to 
those against foreign states designated by the U.S. State Department 
as “state sponsors of terrorism.”22 The Court of Appeals for the 
 
 18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2333-34 (2006). See 137 CONG. REC. S740 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1991) 
(statement of Sen. Grassley).  But the courts have interpreted personal jurisdiction more 
narrowly under the ATA than under the AEDPA. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 690-91, 740; see, 
e.g., Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 310 F. Supp. 2d 172, 178 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(restricting personal jurisdiction of the courts to the traditional “minimum contacts” test for 
claims brought under the ATA). 
 19. 18 U.S.C. § 2337 (2006). The legislative history of the 1992 amendment indicates that it 
was intended merely to clarify that ordinary principles of sovereign immunity, as codified by the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),  would apply to foreign states and their 
instrumentalities. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–11 (2006)). 
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2006). See generally Allison Taylor, Another Front in the War 
on Terrorism? Problems with Recent Changes to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 45 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 533 (2003) (discussing flaws in this provision and its revisions, concluding that the 
terrorism exception to the FSIA has accomplished neither compensation nor deterrence). 
 21. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (2006). The “Flatow Amendment” was named after Alisa Flatow, 
a twenty-year old college student from New Jersey who was killed in 1995 by a suicide bomber 
while spending a semester abroad in Israel. Her father, Stephen Flatow, has been a tireless 
crusader against terrorism in his efforts to collect the rest of the punitive damages awarded by 
the court. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 27-34 (D.D.C. 1998) (awarding 
$22.5 million in compensatory damages and $225 million in punitive damages against the 
government of Iran, which the court determined to be responsible for funding the terrorist 
group Palestine Islamic Jihad). 
 22. The foreign state must have been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism “under 
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)) or section 620A 
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District of Columbia Circuit has interpreted the Flatow Amendment 
as providing a cause of action only against agents or employees of a 
foreign state, but not against the foreign state itself or its 
governmental agencies that are not separate and distinct from the 
foreign state.23 Moreover, in interpreting claims brought under this 
statute following the Flatow Amendment, the most prevalent view of 
the courts has been that punitive damages are allowed only against 
agencies and instrumentalities of a foreign state and individuals in 
their personal capacities, not against the foreign state itself.24 This 
restrictive view has been modified by the newly passed statutory 
revisions discussed below.25 Despite the limitations that have been 
inferred by courts, the AEDPA remains the primary avenue for civil 
actions against sponsors of terrorism. 
In addition, the ATCA confers jurisdiction on federal district 
courts for “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”26 
Although traditionally utilized to provide a cause of action for aliens 
rather than U.S. citizens and applied mainly to human rights 
violations, its reach has been extended with the addition of the 
TVPA. The TVPA applies to both aliens and U.S. citizens injured by 
acts of torture or extrajudicial killing committed under color of 
foreign law.27 As such, depending on the facts of the case, these two 
 
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) at the time the act occurred, unless later 
so designated as a result of such act or the act is related to Case Number 1:00CV03110(EGS) in 
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A).  See 
generally Jason Binimow & Amy Bunk, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of 
“Foreign Terrorist Organization” Provision of Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189, 178 A.L.R. FED. 535 (2002) (collecting and discussing cases 
decided under the foreign terrorist organization provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act § 1189). For more on the designation of “state sponsors of terrorism,” see 
infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. 
 23. See Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
This narrow interpretation was effectively overruled in the most recent amendment of this 
provision. See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. 
 24. See, e.g., Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (awarding 
punitive damage against the Cuban Air Force but not against the Republic of Cuba); Weinstein 
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13, 24 n.1 (D.D.C. 2002) (concluding that punitive 
damages were no longer available under this statute). 
 25. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(c) (West 2008). See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. 
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 27. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note 
(2006)). See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4 (1991) (explaining that the TVPA provides “an 
unambiguous basis for a cause of action that has been successfully maintained under” the 
ATCA); see also Strauss, supra note 2, at 710-14. 
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statutes may offer victims of terrorism a cause of action for claims 
against a foreign state founded upon the broad jurisdiction of 
AEDPA.28 
In recent years, the best approach has been to employ the 
aggregate model in order to pursue the widest array of defendants, 
claims, and damages.29 For example, plaintiffs can apply the ATA to 
non-sovereign defendants, FSIA section 1605(a)(7) to sovereign state 
sponsors of terrorism, and the Flatow Amendment to agents and 
instrumentalities of a foreign state.30 Using these laws in tandem, one 
can hold agents of foreign states liable in both their official and 
personal capacity, including potential “aider and abettor” liability.31  
 
 28. See, e.g., Regier v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 87, 98-99 (D.D.C. 2003), 
abrogated by Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(action by professor who was taken hostage and tortured by Hezbollah in 1984, successfully 
pursued against Iran and the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security under the FSIA 
section 1605(a)(7), the TVPA, and several common-law claims); note, however, that this case 
was later abrogated by Cicippio-Puleo, which adopted a more narrow view of section 1605 as 
merely jurisdictional but was, in turn, superseded by the new legislation. See infra notes 92-93 
and accompanying text. Cases brought under the AEDPA carry a more expansive view of 
personal jurisdiction over individual defendants than the restrictive traditional approach of 
some courts under the ATA. See, e.g., Pugh v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 290 F. 
Supp. 2d 54, 59-60 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding personal jurisdiction over individual officials, agents, 
and employees of Libyan intelligence service for midair explosion because the plane they chose 
to destroy was on an international flight; thus, the individual defendants could and should have 
reasonably postulated that passengers of many nationalities would be on board, from which they 
could also expect they might be haled into the courts of those nations whose citizens would die).  
See also Strauss, supra note 2, at 704-05 (discussing the Pugh case, in which the court applied an 
expansive view of the minimum contacts test under the Due Process clause to the AEDPA in 
establishing personal jurisdiction over these individual defendants). 
 29. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 739-40 (in view of statutory limitations, proposing an 
aggregate model of combining federal statutory and state common-law claims). 
 30. See, e.g., Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (awarding estates and survivors of two victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Center who sued defendants Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Taliban, al Qaeda, 
Osama bin Laden, and the Republic of Iraq, pursuant to the ATA and the FSIA, economic 
damages, pain and suffering, solatium damages—but not punitive damages—and treble 
damages for the non-sovereign defendants). 
 31. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477-78, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting 
nonparticipants in tortuous conduct may be subject to liability for  the tortious conduct of 
another, aiding-abetting focuses on whether a defendant knowingly gave “substantial 
assistance” to someone who performed wrongful conduct); Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. 
Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 104-05 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477, 484) 
(discussing elements of aiding and abetting as means of establishing vicarious civil liability in 
tort to include that party whom defendant aids must perform wrongful act that causes injury, 
that defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of overall illegal or tortious activity at 
time that he provides assistance, and that defendant must knowingly and substantially assist 
principal violation; further, a joint venturer’s liability extends to all reasonably foreseeable acts 
done in connection with the tortious act that the person assisted); Boim v. Quranic Literacy 
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Because courts lately have interpreted the Flatow Amendment as not 
conferring a cause of action but as merely providing jurisdiction, 
plaintiffs have looked to additional statutory bases and have 
combined claims, many of which are state law claims.32 To the extent 
these lawsuits rely upon other federal and/or common-law tort claims 
in order to pursue terrorist organizations and state sponsors of 
terrorism in court, they are also limited in the relief that can be 
granted. While punitive damages have not been available under the 
AEDPA against all defendants (i.e., not against foreign states or 
agents in their official capacities), these damages have been available 
in some circumstances through common-law intentional torts.33 On 
the other hand, this dilemma has produced a potpourri of lawsuits 
 
Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1018 (N.D. Ill. 2001), aff’d, 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that plaintiffs may bring a cause of action under section 2333  based on a theory that defendants 
aided and abetted international terrorism); see also Peter M. Mansfield, Terrorism and a Civil 
Cause of Action: Boim, Ungar, and Joint Torts, 3 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L., at *25 (2003), 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/jicl/spring2003.html (outlining elements of a cause of action for aiding 
and abetting a tort under sections 2333 and 1607). 
 32. To the extent the plaintiffs rely upon common law tort claims as the cause of action, 
these torts must be based on the common law of a particular state. See Acree v. Republic of 
Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating “generic common law cannot be the source of a 
federal cause of action . . . [r]ather, as in any case, a plaintiff proceeding under the FSIA must 
identify a particular cause of action arising out of a specific source of law”); see also Kilburn v. 
Republic of Iran, 277 F. Supp. 2d 24, 35-36 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing other cases establishing that a 
plaintiff bringing suit under the Flatow Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (2006), may base his 
claim on conventional state common-law torts such as assault, battery, and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress), aff’d, 376 F.3d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2004), abrogated by Cicippio-Puleo v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Stethem v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 201 F. Supp. 2d 78, 87 (D.D.C. 2002); Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F. Supp. 2d 27, 
33-37 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d, 315 F.3d 325 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 47-50 (D.D.C. 2001); Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 
107, 113 (D.D.C. 2000). In each of these cases, the court held that the Flatow Amendment 
clearly provided a cause of action against an “official, employee, or agent” of a foreign state for 
the terrorist act, but questioned whether this provision also established a cause of action against 
the foreign state itself; the later cases, post Cicippio-Puleo, limited the Flatow amendment to 
these officials in their personal capacity and required an alternate basis, such as specific 
common law tort claims, for a cause of action against the foreign state. 
 33. See Kilburn, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (addressing this issue and supporting the availability 
of punitive damages); see also Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 278-
79 (D.D.C. 2003) (in terrorist bombing, defendants were liable for common law torts of assault, 
battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; included in the damages against Iran’s 
Ministry of Information and Security and senior Iranian officials were punitive damages in the 
amount of $300 million). But see Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 404 F. Supp. 2d 261, 
274-75 (D.D.C. 2005) (punitive damages not available against Iran’s Ministry of Information 
and Security as an arm of the foreign state because such damages can only be awarded “against 
an ‘agency or instrumentality’ of a terrorist-sponsoring state, but not against the foreign state 
itself” and the MOIS “must be treated as the state of Iran itself rather than as its agent”) (citing 
Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 
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with inconsistent results in terms of the amount and type of damages 
awarded.34 
One of the more prominent recent cases, Hurst v. Socialist 
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, involved the terrorist act that 
destroyed Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 
21, 1988, killing all 259 passengers on board and eleven people on the 
ground.35 Eleven family members of four of the victims brought suit 
against the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Jamahiriya 
Security Organization (“JSO”), the Libyan Arab Airline (“LAA”), 
and two Libyan intelligence officials.  They based their claims on the 
state-sponsored terrorism exception of the FSIA, section 1605(a)(7); 
the Flatow Amendment; the TVPA; the ATA; intentional infliction 
of emotional distress; and civil conspiracy.36 In denying the Libyan 
defendants’ motion to dismiss, the District Court for the District of 
Columbia explained that the plaintiffs properly asserted the state-
sponsored terrorist exception to the FSIA as a jurisdictional vehicle, 
and proceeded to find a sufficient independent cause of action in their 
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil 
conspiracy to commit wrongful death and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, under which plaintiffs sought damages for 
economic loss, pain and suffering, and solatium.37 However, the Court 
agreed with defendant Libya that punitive damages were not 
available against it or the JSO, which operated as an arm of the 
 
 34. See Jennifer K. Elsea, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: SUITS AGAINST TERRORIST 
STATES BY VICTIMS OF TERRORISM 2 (updated Dec. 17, 2007) available at http://stinet.dtic.mil/ 
cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=A476151&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (for the most recent 
version of this report, updated August, 8, 2008, see http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/ 
RL31258.pdf) [hereinafter CRS REPORT]; see also Hans Jörg Albrecht & Michael Kilchling, 
Victims of Terrorism Policies: Should Victims of Terrorism be Treated Differently?, 13 EUR. J. 
CRIM. POL’Y RES. 13, 23 (2007) (criticizing disparate treatment of 9/11 victims compared to 
victims of other terrorist acts as well as among 9/11 victims and arguing for adoption of a 
principled approach to compensation based on social solidarity rather than tort law rules). 
 35. Hurst v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 474 F. Supp. 2d 19, 22 (D.D.C. 
2007). In a subsequent development, Libya paid $1.5 billion into a fund to settle the claims of 
the families of American victims of the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, 
and the 1986 bombing of a German disco.  In exchange, on October 31, 2008, in a move towards 
"normalizing relations between the United States and Libya," President Bush signed an 
Executive Order, "Settlement of Claims Against Libya," dismissing pending cases against Libya, 
providing for a claims procedure for U.S. nationals, and restoring the Libyan government’s 
immunity from terror-related lawsuits.  See Exec. Order No. 13,477, 73 Fed. Reg. 65,965 (Nov. 5, 
2008); Matthew Lee, Libya Pays to Resolve Terrorism Claims, Associated Press, Oct. 31, 2008, 
http://news.aol.com/artcle/libya-pays-to-resolve-terrorism-claims/2036396. 
 36. Hurst, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 22. 
 37. Id. at 27. 
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government. The court declined to rule on this issue with respect to 
the LAA, pending a determination as to whether the LAA’s core 
functions were commercial or governmental.38 In considering and 
denying the individual defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court 
interpreted section 2337 of the ATA to permit the officers to be sued 
in their personal capacity, “even for acts sanctioned by terrorist 
states.”39 Accordingly, the victims’ lawsuit was allowed to proceed 
against these defendants. 
Most recently, Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran arose from 
the October 23, 1983 bombing of a U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, 
Lebanon, in which 241 American servicemen operating under 
peacetime rules of engagement were murdered by a suicide bomber.40 
The plaintiffs founded their claims upon section 1605(a)(7) of the 
FSIA, along with state common-law claims of wrongful death, 
battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging that 
the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Iran”) and its Ministry of Information 
and Security (“MOIS”) were liable for damages from the attack 
because they provided material support and assistance to Hezbollah, 
the terrorist organization that orchestrated and carried out the 
bombing. Following the entry of judgment against Iran and MOIS, 
special masters were appointed to consider damages on behalf of the 
nearly one thousand plaintiffs, consisting of members of U.S. armed 
forces injured or killed in the attack, and their family members and 
estates. On September 7, 2007, the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia awarded the victims and their families a historic $2.65 
billion in damages, mostly for pain and suffering, but noted that no 
punitive damages were available against the foreign state or its 
governmental entity.41 As Judge Lamberth observed: 
 
 38. Id. at 28. 
 39. Id. at 29 n.13 (citing Strauss, supra note 2, stating “[t]he legislative history of section 
2337 indicates that it was intended merely to clarify that ordinary principles of sovereign 
immunity, as codified by the FSIA, would apply to foreign states and their instrumentalities”). 
 40. Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46, 48 (D.D.C. 2003) (involving 
plaintiff family members of the 241 deceased servicemen and injured survivors of the October 
23, 1983 suicide bombing attack of a Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon who brought two 
actions against defendant Islamic Republic of Iran and its Ministry of Information and 
Security). 
 41. Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F. Supp. 2d 25, 59 (D.D.C. 2007) (judgment 
entered in the amount of $2.65 billion). On the issue of punitive damages, Judge Lamberth 
noted that such damages are “not available [under the FSIA] against foreign states such as the 
Islamic Republic of Iran,” citing Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 425 F. Supp. 2d 56, 71 
(D.D.C. 2006), nor the Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) since “MOIS is a 
governmental entity, and part of the state of Iran itself.” Peterson, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (citing 
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Not to be forgotten is the courage demonstrated by the family 
members who have come forth in bringing this claim. These 
individuals, whose hearts and souls were forever broken on 
October 23, 1983, have waited patiently for nearly a quarter of a 
century for justice to be done, and to be made whole again. And 
though this Court can neither bring back the husbands, sons, 
fathers and brothers who were lost in this heinous display of 
violence, nor undo the tragic events of that day, the law offers a 
meager attempt to make the surviving family members whole, 
through seeking monetary damages against those who perpetrated 
this heinous attack. 42 
Reflecting on the dual goals of this civil approach, he concluded, 
“[t]he Court hopes that this extremely sizeable judgment will serve to 
aid in the healing process for these plaintiffs, and simultaneously 
sound an alarm to the defendants that their unlawful attacks on our 
citizens will not be tolerated.”43 
Indeed, the courts generally have been supportive of employing 
federal statutory and state common-law tools to do their part in the 
battle against terrorism.44 Thus, “despite the political and diplomatic 
encumbrances inherent when private litigants utilize the judicial 
branch to target rogue terrorist actors, the use of terrorism lawsuits 
represents the way of the new world, where democracies must utilize 
every means at their disposal to fight terrorist actors.”45 However, 
U.S. courts face inherent limits in their attempts at “bringing 
terrorists to justice on an international scale” due to the difficulty of 
establishing personal jurisdiction and effecting service of process.46 
 
Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229, 270-71 (D.D.C. 2006)); 
Greenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 451 F. Supp. 2d 90, 105 & n.1 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing 
Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 232-33 (D.C. Cir.2003)); and Haim, 425 F. 
Supp. 2d at 71 n.2. 
 42. Peterson, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 60. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Ed Morgan, Op-Ed., Counterterrorism in the Courtroom, CJC OP-EDS. Dec. 23, 
2005, available at http://www.cjc.ca/template.php?action=oped&Rec=150. 
 45. John D. Shipman, Taking Terrorism to Court: A Legal Examination of the New Front in 
the War on Terrorism, 86 N.C. L. REV. 526, 530 (2008). “[C]ivil litigation will likely bring about 
greater accountability for defendants that finance and harbor terrorist entities” than criminal 
prosecution. Id. at 570. “Increasing the likelihood that terrorists will be held responsible for 
their economic damages will provide an additional disincentive to carrying out acts of 
international terrorism.” Id. 
 46. Id. at 530 & n.25. 
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B. Obstacles to Enforcement in the United States and Abroad 
Faced with the difficulty of locating abroad the assets of terrorist 
organizations and the groups that fund them, the victims and their 
families pursuing civil actions in the war on terrorism most often have 
sought to enforce their judgments in U.S. courts by investigating and 
attaching assets tied to the terrorist defendants or through frozen 
assets as permitted by Congress or the executive branch. A Report 
for Congress by the Congressional Research Service observes that: 
“Default judgments won against terrorist States have proved difficult 
to enforce, and efforts by plaintiffs to attach frozen assets and 
diplomatic or consular property, while receiving support from 
Congress, have met with opposition from the executive branch. . . . 
The use of U.S. funds to pay portions of some judgments has drawn 
criticism.”47 Moreover, the prospects for executing these judgments 
abroad has been hampered by common trends in international law 
which tend to limit the enforcement of judgments when the foreign 
court views the amount of money awarded to be excessive or the 
jurisdictional net to have been cast too widely. 
1. Executing Judgments in the United States 
In the United States, the authorization for freezing assets arises 
from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(“IEEPA”),48 which in the case of “unusual and extraordinary” 
foreign threats “to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of 
the United States,” authorizes the President, among other things, to 
“regulate . . . or prohibit . . . transactions involving, any property in 
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by 
any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States.”49 The statute grants the President wide 
discretion in controlling international financial transactions, including 
the seizure of foreign assets held in U.S. banks or foreign branches of 
 
 47. See CRS REPORT, supra note 34, at 2. 
 48. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07 (2000). 
 49. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a), 1702(a)(1)(B) (2000). The controversy surrounding the broad 
powers granted to the government under the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, and its expansion of 
the seizure of assets provisions under IEEPA, will not be discussed here. See Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, as amended.  
See RICHARD SCHAFFER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 263-
66 (Thomson South-Western, 6th ed. 2005). For a discussion of the merits of allowing the 
victims access to these funds, see Strauss, supra note 2, at 730, 742. 
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U.S. banks.50 These broad powers have been repeatedly sustained by 
courts.51 Using the IEEPA, U.S. presidents have taken economic 
action against other governments as a means of implementing foreign 
policy. 
IEEPA functions as a sword wielded against terrorism because it 
allows the seizure of the assets of terrorist groups and organizations 
whose funds can be traced to terrorism. Pursuant to the IEEPA, the 
President issued Executive Order 12947 in 1995, which designated 
certain terrorist organizations “Specially Designated Terrorists” 
(“SDTs”), and blocked all their property interests. 52 The order also 
allowed for additional designations if an organization or person is 
found to be “owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of,” an 
SDT.53 The President used this order to prohibit the contribution, 
either in the United States or by U.S. citizens outside the country, of 
funds, goods or services to or for Jihad, Hezbollah, Hamas, the 
 
 50. Section 1702(a)(1)(A) provides, inter alia, that: 
the President may, under such regulations as he may prescribe, by means of 
instructions, licenses, or otherwise-- 
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit-- 
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange, 
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking 
institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest 
of any foreign country or a national thereof, 
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities, by any person, or 
with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
 51. See, e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 167 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (affirming the District Court’s dismissal of a challenge by HLF to its designation as a 
“Specially Designated Global Terrorist” pursuant to an Executive Order issued under the 
IEEPA, accompanied by an order blocking all of the organization’s assets); Global Relief 
Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The statute is designed to give the 
President means to control assets that could be used by enemy aliens.”); Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi 
Ministry, 27 F.3d 695, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1994) remanded to 871 F.Supp. 1463 (D.D.C. 1994), rev’d, 
71 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (providing that the Treasury “may choose and apply its own 
definition of property interests, subject to deferential judicial review”). 
 52. Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5,079 (Jan. 23, 1995). An initial list of SDTs was 
published on January 25, 1995, further defining the term in summarizing this executive order:  
“In addition, the Order blocks all property and interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction 
in which there is any interest of persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
coordination with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to be owned or controlled 
by, or to act for or on behalf of, any other person designated pursuant to the Order (collectively 
‘Specially Designated Terrorists’ or ‘SDTs’).” 60 Fed. Reg. 5,084 (Jan. 25, 1995); see also 60 Fed. 
Reg. 41152-01 (Aug. 11, 1995) (adding name to the SDT list). Additional regulations have 
implemented the order based upon this designation. See, e.g., Restrictions on exports and 
reexports to persons designated pursuant to Executive Order 12947 (Specially Designated 
Terrorist) (SDT), 15 C.F.R. § 744.13 (2008). 
 53. Id. 
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Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and several other 
groups and individuals.54 After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, President Bush issued Executive Order 13224, Blocking 
Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, 
Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism, pursuant to the IEEPA.55 
Similar to Order 12947, Order 13224 designated specified terrorist 
organizations “Specially Designated Global Terrorists” (“SDGTs”) 
and blocked all their property interests subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States.56 The order allowed for additional SDGTs to be 
designated if organizations or persons are found to “act for or on 
behalf of” or are “owned or controlled by” designated terrorists or if 
they “assist in, sponsor, or provide . . .  support for” or are “otherwise 
associated” with them.57 
The designated terrorist states whose assets have been blocked 
by the United States currently include Cuba, Iran, North Korea, 
Sudan, and Syria; a recent report indicates that these assets now total 
$309.5 million.58 Note that as recently as 2002, the amount of frozen 
 
 54. Id. See also 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (2007) (providing civil and criminal maximum penalties of 
$250,000 and a $1 million fine and/or twenty years imprisonment, respectively). 
 55. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). 
 56. Id. The implementing regulations further provided: “The term specially designated 
global terrorist or SDGT means any foreign person or person listed in the Annex or designated 
pursuant to Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001.” See Global Terrorism Sanctions 
Regulations, General Definitions, Specially designated global terrorist; SDGT, 31 C.F.R. § 
594.310 (2008); see also Restrictions on exports and reexports to persons designated in or 
pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (Specially Designated Global Terrorist) (SDGT), 15 C.F.R. 
§ 744.12 (2008). 
 57. Id. For example, on November 2, Hamas and twenty-one other foreign terrorist 
organizations not related to al Qaeda were added to the executive order. Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treas., Shutting Down Terrorist Financial Networks (Dec. 4, 2001), 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po841.htm. On December 4, 2001, pursuant to this order, 
the Bush Administration froze the assets of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and 
Development, Beit Al-Mal Holdings, and Al-Aqsa Islamic Bank. Id. “President Bush said all 
three are Hamas-controlled organizations that finance terror.” Id. At that time, the United 
States had designated 153 individuals, organizations, and financial supporters of terrorism 
worldwide pursuant to Executive Order 13224. Id. See also U.S. Targets Hamas Funding, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 22, 2003 (explaining that “the Bush Administration froze the assets of 
six senior Hamas leaders and five European-based organizations it says raise money for the 
radical Palestinian group,” in “the first effort to block Hamas’ assets or funding sources outside 
the United States”). 
 58. For an itemized list of the amount of these assets, see CRS Report, supra note 34, at 62 
app. II (The amount of assets of terrorist states blocked by the United States as of that date 
consisted of: Cuba, $196.1 million; Iran, $1.1 million; North Korea, $31.7 million; Sudan, $80.6 
million; and Syria, $0 million.). See also OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREAS., CALENDAR YEAR 2006 FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ASSETS 
IN THE UNITED STATES OF TERRORIST COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
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assets in the United States totaled $3.1 billion.59 Many of those assets 
already have been depleted due to the satisfaction of victims’ civil 
judgments and their removal from the pool of funds by the 
President.60 
Resistance from the executive branch at times presents an 
obstacle to the pursuit of claims as well as the collection efforts by 
victims of terrorist acts. As a matter of foreign policy, the President 
regards frozen assets as a powerful bargaining chip to induce behavior 
desirable to the United States; accordingly, allowing private plaintiffs 
to file civil lawsuits and tap into the frozen assets located in the 
United States may weaken the executive branch’s negotiating 
position with other countries.61 For this reason, several U.S. 
presidents have opposed giving victims access to these funds.62 “On 
the other hand, doing so may send a strong, unified message to 
countries that sponsor terrorism.”63 
 
PROGRAM DESIGNEES 14 tbl.1 (2006) [hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ASSETS] (figures 
do not include the values of diplomatic and consular real property owned by Iran). Note that 
the list no longer includes Iraq and Libya. Id. at 9 n.11; see also 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(A) (2008). 
 59. See DAVID M. ACKERMAN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: SUITS AGAINST TERRORIST 
STATES, at 25 app. II (Jan. 25, 2002), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/8045.pdf (the 
amount of assets of terrorist states blocked by the United States as of that date consisted of: 
Cuba, $193.5 million; Iran, $347.5 million; Iraq, $1587 million; Libya, $1072.2 million; North 
Korea, $24 million; Sudan, $33.3 million; and Syria, $249 million). 
 60. See infra note 73. 
 61. See, e.g., CRS REPORT, supra note 34, at 9 (setting forth the rationale of the Clinton 
Administration opposing the efforts to allow access to the blocked assets of Iran and Cuba, on 
the grounds that historically such assets have been used as leverage in foreign policy disputes, 
may be used for negotiating possible future reestablishment of normal relations with these 
countries, and could expose the United States to the risk of reciprocal actions against U.S. 
assets). See also President William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Omnibus Consolidated 
and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2108, 
2113 (Oct. 23, 1998) (“Absent my authority to waive section 117’s attachment provision, it 
would also effectively eliminate use of blocked assets of terrorist states in the national security 
interests of the United States, including denying an important source of leverage.”). 
 62. For a history of the objections of both the Clinton and Bush Administrations to the use 
of frozen assets of terrorist states to satisfy victims’ judgments for compensatory damages, which 
was noted most vehemently in their opposition to the passage of the Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act of 2000 (“VTVPA”) and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
(“TRIA”), discussed infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text, see CRS REPORT, supra note 34, 
at 9-11, 13, 15, 23. For this reason, although section 2002 of the VTVPA allows claimants to 
execute against certain assets, the President was given the authority to stop the attachment of 
the frozen assets of a state “in the interest of national security.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(3) 
(2006). Immediately after signing the legislation into law, President Clinton exercised this 
waiver authority. Presidential Determination No. 2001-03, 65 Fed. Reg. 66,483 (Oct. 28, 2000). 
 63. Strauss, supra note 2, at 730. 
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In contrast, the U.S. Congress generally has supported the needs 
of victims and their families by enacting legislation. Congress enacted 
the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 
(“VTVPA”) to allow certain victims of terrorists’ acts an opportunity 
to recover funds from the United States to satisfy their outstanding 
judgments.64 Because it was a result of presidential opposition and 
congressional compromise, the scope of the VTVPA was limited. It 
only authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to pay portions of the 
judgments from eleven lawsuits that had been or would be decided 
against Cuba or Iran under the FSIA exception 1605(a)(7) between 
the time it was enacted in 1996 and a July 27, 2000 cut-off date (for 
the filing of the suit).65 Section 2002 of the VTVPA provided no 
assistance for plaintiffs in any other lawsuits against terrorist groups 
and state sponsors of terrorism for which the courts have continued to 
enter judgments. 
Calls for equal access to frozen assets for all U.S. victims of state-
sponsored terrorism who have secured judgments led to the passage 
of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (“TRIA”).66 The TRIA 
 
 64. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act (VTVPA), Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 27, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 65. For one judgment against Cuba, section 2002 provided that payment would be made 
from the assets of Cuba in the United States that have been blocked since 1962. Id. § 2002. See 
Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1253 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (awarding 
approximately $50 million in compensatory damages and $137.7 million in punitive damages to 
the families of three of the four people who were killed in 1996 when Cuban aircraft shot down 
two “Brothers to the Rescue” planes). For another ten judgments against Iran, Congress 
directed that payment be made from appropriated funds (up to a specified ceiling) and that the 
United States then be entitled to seek reimbursement for those payments from Iran.  Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act § 2002(b)(2). See Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
154 F. Supp. 2d 27, 27-28 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d, 315 F.3d 325 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Polhill v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15322, at *6 (D.D.C. 2001); Sutherland v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 27-28 (D.D.C. 2001); Wagner v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
172 F. Supp. 2d 128, 138 (D.D.C. 2001); Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 
107, 107-08 (D.D.C. 2000); Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-11 (D.D.C. 
2000); Higgins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22173, at *6-8 (D.D.C. 2000); 
Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 62 (D.D.C. 1998); Flatow v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 27-34 (D.D.C. 1998).  However, difficulties in the collection of 
these judgments have continued. See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 305 F.3d 1249 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that subpoena seeking all documents pertaining to defendant’s 
finances could be narrowed to exclude Iranian property subject to license by federal 
government). 
 66. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322, (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 28 U.S.C.). See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Charles E. 
Schumer, Schumer: Give Victims of Terrorism Access to Frozen Assets of Terrorist States (July 
14, 2002), http://www.senate.gov/~schumer/Schumer-Website/pressroom/press_releases/PR0108 
8.html (proposing bill to “provide equal access to all US victims of state sponsored terrorism 
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subjects the blocked assets of a terrorist party and any agency or 
instrumentality of that terrorist party to execution or attachment to 
satisfy a judgment against them for any claim based on an act of 
terrorism.67 Section 201(a) of the TRIA provides that a person who 
has obtained a judgment against a foreign state designated as a state 
sponsor of terrorism may seek to attach the blocked assets of that 
state in satisfaction of an award of compensatory damages based on 
an act of terrorism.68 The TRIA currently provides the means through 
which the U.S. government allows access to the frozen assets of 
terrorist states and organizations held in the United States, and it 
assists plaintiffs’ efforts to identify and seize additional assets. 
In total, “U.S. courts have awarded victims of terrorism more 
than $10 billion in judgments against State sponsors of terrorism 
under the terrorism exception to the FSIA,” primarily in those cases 
designated under section 2002 of the VTVPA.69 Under section 201 of 
the TRIA, claimants in cases not covered by the VTVPA vie with 
each other to obtain the blocked assets of terrorist states to satisfy the 
compensatory damages portions of their judgments.70 But in the case 
of Iran, the defendant in the largest number of lawsuits filed by 
victims of terrorism, blocked assets are “virtually non-existent.”71  
“Most of the Cuban assets made available by §2002 [of the VTVPA] 
to satisfy judgments have . . . been paid out to judgment creditors.”72  
Finally, the President has removed Iraq’s blocked assets from the pot 
of funds previously available to satisfy judgments against Iraq.73 
 
who have secured judgements [sic] and awards in Federal courts against state sponsors of 
terrorism”). 
 67. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 201. 
 68. See id. 
 69. CRS REPORT, supra note 34, at 54 (“[C]laimants in the first tier of cases designated 
under § 2002 of the Victims of Trafficking Act were able to obtain either 100 percent or 110 
percent of their compensatory damages awards — nearly $100 million in one case against Cuba 
out of Cuba’s blocked assets, more than $380 million in ten cases against Iran out of U.S. funds. 
Claimants in a second tier of cases designated under § 2002 received a smaller percentage of 
their compensatory damages awards — about 20 percent.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Anneliese Gryta, A Herculean Task for Judge Hercules: Analytical Avoidance 
in Iran v. Elahi, 41 AKRON L. REV. 249, 281 (2008) (“[F]laws with the terrorist state exception 
of the FSIA add up to propagate unenforceable judgments” because “full redress to victims is 
unlikely because of a lack of attachable assets” and inconsistent treatment of victims). 
 71. CRS REPORT, supra note 34, at 54. 
 72. Id. See also Julie Kay, Miami Lawyers Race Each Other to Frozen Cuban Funds, MIAMI 
DAILY BUS. REV., Oct. 1, 2007, at 1 (revealing difficulties experienced by judgment creditors of 
Cuba in attempting to collect damages). 
 73. At the end of 2002, Iraq’s blocked assets totaled approximately $1.73 billion. See 
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., CALENDAR YEAR 2002 
STRAUSS_FMT2.1.DOC 1/28/2009  12:00:15 PM 
2009] CIVIL LAWSUITS IN THE BATTLE AGAINST TERRORISM 325 
With the passage of the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, 
discussed below, the total amount of judgments against state sponsors 
of terrorism and former state sponsors of terrorism is likely to 
increase. “Whether more assets of those States will become available 
to satisfy those judgments is less certain.”74 Already there are 
numerous judgments in which damage awards to the victims have not 
yet been satisfied.75 However, it is hoped that this civil approach to 
fighting terrorism will prove effective, so that “if the terrorism 
exception to the FSIA results in a decrease in terrorist attacks 
affecting the interests of U.S. persons, such judgments should become 
less common with the passage of time and the statute of limitations.”76 
2. Collecting from Assets Overseas 
Some common trends in international law serve as an 
impediment to the enforcement of judgments against terrorist 
organizations and the parties that support them. As a general matter, 
judgments of U.S. courts often will be enforced by foreign courts on 
the basis of reciprocity and comity in countries where the losing party 
or its property can be found.77 However, foreign courts often are 
reluctant to recognize and enforce decisions of U.S. courts that 
include foreign governments or officials as defendants, or decisions 
that award punitive or treble damages, which are only recognized in 
the United States.78 
In general commercial matters, uniform legislation and treaties 
facilitate uniformity and certainty of enforcement of judgments in the 
 
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES OF TERRORIST 
COUNTRIES OR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM PROGRAM DESIGNEES  8 (2002). On March 20, 
2003, immediately after the United States initiated military action against Iraq, President Bush 
issued an executive order effecting the transfer of Iraq’s frozen assets to the U.S. government to 
be placed in the Development Fund for Iraq for use in the postwar reconstruction of Iraq. See 
Exec. Order No. 13,290, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,307 (Mar. 20, 2003). These and other subsequent 
actions of the President have made Iraq’s frozen assets unavailable to victims who obtain 
judgments against Iraq for its connection with terrorism. See, e.g., P.L. 108-11, § 1503, 117 Stat. 
559, 579 (Apr. 16, 2003); Exec. Order No. 13,303, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,931 (May 28, 2003); see also 
CRS REPORT, supra note 34, at 33-34. 
 74. CRS REPORT, supra note 34, at 55. 
 75. For an itemized list of judgments against terrorist states, along with the amounts paid 
out so far and the amount not yet satisfied for each lawsuit, see id. at 56-61 app. I. 
 76. Id. at 55. 
 77. See generally RAY AUGUST, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW 185 (Prentice Hall, 4th 
ed. 2004) (discussing criteria the courts consider in determining whether to enforce a foreign 
judgment, including the public policy of the foreign state and “reciprocity of recognition”). 
 78. Cf. Strauss, supra note 2, at 725. See generally SCHAFFER ET AL., supra note 49, at 96-97 
(addressing the enforcement of foreign judgments). 
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international business community. The Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement of Judgments on Civil and Commercial Matters 
(“Lugano Convention”)79 is one example. Even the Lugano 
Convention, however, which by its terms applies only to judgments of 
the contracting states (not the United States), enumerates several 
situations in which a judgment shall not be recognized. For example, 
a judgment will not be recognized when “such recognition is contrary 
to public policy in the State in which recognition is sought”; “where it 
was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not duly 
served with the document which instituted the proceedings”; or “if 
the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute 
between the same parties in the State in which recognition is 
sought.”80 In this way, the Lugano Convention simply codifies many 
of the general principles and trends in the international forum.  The 
important policy implications in this context are even more 
compelling. 
Ironically, the absence of punitive damages in some U.S. cases 
and, on occasion, the plaintiffs’ failure to obtain treble damages by 
bringing defendants under the scope of the ATA may assist efforts to 
enforce U.S. judgments overseas or at least help to avoid some of the 
enforcement problems generally incurred when punitive or treble 
damages are involved.81 However, jurisdictional objections may 
become an enforcement issue that precludes a foreign state from 
recognizing the judgment. The abrogation of sovereign immunity 
under the AEDPA does not constitute voluntary waiver or consent to 
jurisdiction by a foreign state, and in many of these cases judgments 
were obtained by default because the defendant state declined to 
appear.82 Other states may also reject these judgments, “since comity 
 
 79. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Lugano, 16 September, 1988, 1988 O.J. (C 189). The Lugano Convention 
is in force in eighteen countries of Western Europe and in Poland. The “Contracting States” are 
Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Portugal, Poland, Switzerland, Finland, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In addition to providing recognition generally for the 
judgments of the contracting states without requiring any special procedures, the Lugano 
Convention sets forth details for where the application should be submitted for each of the 
contracting states. 
 80. Id. art. 27. 
 81. See SCHAFFER ET AL., supra note 49, at 96-97. 
 82. See AUGUST, supra note 77, at 185 (many courts will not enforce a default judgment); 
CRS REPORT, supra note 34, at 2 (citing the fact that default judgments entered against terrorist 
states have “proved difficult to enforce”). For example, because Cuba and Iran do not recognize 
the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts and have refused to appear in court; all of the judgments 
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between nations does not require recognition of a judgment that is 
considered void because of the terrorist state’s public policy, 
sovereign immunity, or in cases in which the only contact with the 
forum is the killing of a U.S. national abroad and is thus deemed 
tenuous.”83 
Thus, exploring the obstacles to enforcement of these judgments 
through the rule of international law and the difficulty of accessing 
the frozen assets of terrorist states and organizations reveals that 
more is needed to effectively utilize lawsuits in the war on terrorism. 
At the outset, U.S. law can be strengthened by the addition of tools to 
bolster claims against those connected with terrorism and to open 
viable financial pathways. Additionally, it will be necessary to 
construct an alternate basis upon which more global recognition of 
judgments can be founded. The support of, and collaboration with, 
the international community can provide the critical element for 
plaintiffs in the civil battle against terrorism. 
II. NEW U.S. LAW FACILITATING CIVIL LAWSUITS BY 
VICTIMS 
 A much-anticipated new piece of legislation recently was 
signed into law, originally called the “Justice for Victims of Terrorism 
Act of 2007,” as part of the “National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2008.”84 The new law amends the FSIA—specifically, the 
 
against them have been obtained by default. Id. at 7. See, e.g., Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 68 (D.D.C. 1998); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 27-
32 (D.D.C. 1998); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1249-53 (S.D. Fla. 1997). 
 83. Strauss, supra note 2, at 726. See generally Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Note, Resolving 
Outstanding Judgments Under the Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 496 (2002) (proposing that the best method for resolving the outstanding 
judgments under the FSIA is to terminate them and resubmit the claims to ad hoc international 
tribunals, because the punitive damage awards entered under the terrorism exception make the 
prospect of a substantial taking claim more likely and the tribunals will be created under 
conditions acceptable to the defendant states); W. Michael Reisman & Monica Hakimi, 2001 
Hugo Black Lecture: Illusion and Reality in the Compensation of Victims of International 
Terrorism, 54 ALA. L. REV. 561 (2003) (explaining that, because public international law does 
not conform to the legislative and judicial practices in the United States and does not provide 
for the standards of compensation applied in the U.S. courts, taxpayers through the U.S. 
Treasury are likely to pay for the human rights violations of state sponsors of terrorism). 
 84. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083, 
122 Stat. 3, 338-44 (2008). The “Justice for Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act,” S. 1944, 
was passed by the Senate as part of the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008,” H.R. 1585. A modified version of the provision was included by House and Senate 
Conferees as “Section 1083, Terrorism Exception to Immunity.” On December 28, 2007, H.R. 
1585 was vetoed by President Bush, who argued that the measure would hinder Iraqi 
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portion added in 1996 and known as the “Flatow Amendment”—by 
allowing victims of state-sponsored terrorism to sue countries that 
support and promote terrorism.85 This statute will facilitate these 
lawsuits and the efforts to collect on successful judgments. Until now, 
plaintiffs have had difficulty collecting from the assets of banks 
located in the United States that are subsidiaries or have ties to Iran 
and other countries that are designated as state sponsors of terror.86 
Previously, in order to collect, plaintiffs would have to show that the 
country (e.g., Iran) controls the day-to-day operations of the bank, 
which is nearly impossible to prove.87 The new law enables victims to 
tap into these hidden commercial assets once the connection to the 
foreign country is established.  This change in the law will give great 
assistance to victims and their families and further bolster the civil 
actions confronting terrorism. 
Section 1083 of the Act creates a new section 1605A in title 28 of 
the U.S. Code to incorporate the terrorism exception to sovereign 
immunity under the FSIA currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) 
and to create a cause of action against designated state sponsors of 
terrorism, in lieu of the Flatow Amendment discussed above.88 The 
cause of action and exception to sovereign immunity “apply to cases 
in which money damages are sought for personal injury or death 
 
reconstruction by exposing the current Iraqi government to liability for terrorist acts committed 
by Saddam Hussein’s government.  Senator Lautenberg, one of the original sponsors of S. 1944, 
worked with Senate and House leadership to ensure that section 1083 remained in the bill, while 
giving the Administration authority to waive the provision in cases related to Iraq.  The new bill, 
introduced in the House on January 16 as H.R. 4986, was passed by the House and Senate; and 
signed by the President on January 28, 2008. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-477, at 1001-02 (2007) 
(dealing with H.R. 1585); Press Release, Sen. Lautenberg, Lautenberg-Specter Bill to Provide 
Justice for Victims of State-Sponsored Terrorism Signed into Law (Jan. 29, 2008), 
http://lautenberg.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?-id=291391 [hereinafter Press Release, 
Senator Lautenberg]. 
 85. See Press Release, Senator Lautenberg, supra note 84. 
 86. See, e.g., Flatow v. Alavi Foundation, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17753, at *21 (4th Cir. 
2000) (holding that a not-for-profit foundation in New York was not an instrumentality of a 
foreign government, and thus was not subject to a writ of execution to satisfy plaintiff's 
judgment against the foreign government); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 74 F. Supp. 2d 18, 
19 (D.D.C. 1999) (quashing a writ of attachment for funds which had been awarded by the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal to Iran and were immune in the U.S. Treasury); Flatow v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16, 18 (D.D.C. 1999) (quashing writs of attachment for Iran’s 
embassy and chancery and two bank accounts holding proceeds from the rental of these 
properties). See also Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States, State 
Jurisdiction and Jurisdictional Immunities, Satisfaction of U.S. Judgments Against State Sponsors 
of Terrorism, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 117 (2000). 
 87. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1073 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 88. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A (West 2008). 
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caused by certain defined terrorist acts or the provision of material 
support when conducted by an official, agent, or employee of the 
State acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or 
agency.”89 Specifically, it provides that: 
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts 
of the United States or of the States in any case not otherwise 
covered by this chapter in which money damages are sought against 
a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an 
act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, 
or the provision of material support or resources for such an act if 
such act or provision of material support or resources is engaged in 
by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting 
within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.90 
In addition to this jurisdictional provision, the newly passed 
legislation expressly creates a private right of action to seek money 
damages in U.S. courts against a foreign state that is or was a state 
sponsor of terrorism and any official, employee, or agent of that 
foreign state acting within the scope of employment.91 This 
development effectively overrules the decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Cicippio-
Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran,92 which interpreted section 1605 of 
the FSIA as a merely jurisdictional vehicle that does not confer a 
private right of action against a foreign state and limited the Flatow 
Amendment to providing a cause of action against officials, 
employees, and agents of the foreign state in their individual 
capacity.93 The new law further holds a foreign state vicariously liable 
for the actions of its officials, employees, or agents.94 It provides for a 
wide array of damages, including “economic damages, solatium, pain 
and suffering, and punitive damages.”95 Previously some courts had 
limited the types of damages available, and in particular excluded 
 
 89. See CRS REPORT, supra note 34, at 44 (analyzing H.R. 1585 after it had passed in the 
House and Senate before being vetoed by the President and incorporated into H.R. 4986, which 
was signed into law). 
 90. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(a)(1). 
 91. Id. § 1605A(c). 
 92. Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 93. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 706-09. 
 94. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(c). 
 95. Id. In addition, it makes available to the U.S. district courts funding for special masters 
through the Victims of Crime Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 10603(c). 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(e). See, 
e.g., Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F. Supp. 2d 25, 40, 60–67 (D.D.C. 2007) (special 
masters appointed to determine damages in connection with the 1983 bombing of the Marine 
barracks in Lebanon awarded $2.65 billion of damages to nearly one thousand plaintiffs). 
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punitive damages against a foreign state,96 but these now are 
permitted explicitly under the new provision. 
Note that the law retains the condition that the foreign state be 
designated by the State Department as a “state sponsor of 
terrorism.”97 This prerequisite has the odd effect of combining law 
and politics by hinging an individual’s private right of action on the 
U.S. government’s decision to designate a state as a sponsor of 
terrorism.98 However, the Act sets the parameters for satisfaction of 
this condition more broadly. Under the Act, this requirement is 
satisfied if the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of 
terrorism either at the time of the act, or as a result of the act, within 
the six month period before the claim is filed, or when the original 
action was filed (if now being refiled by reason of section 
1083(c)(2)(A) or (c)(3) or as a related action).99 Thus, if a state is 
removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, in effect it 
triggers a six-month period within which to file a suit or be time 
barred under the statute.100 The new law also contains a formal statute 
of limitations of ten years after April 24, 1996 or ten years from the 
date on which the cause of action arose, whichever is later, for the 
commencement of an action or a related action under the prior 
section 1605(a)(7).101 
 
 96. See, e.g., Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 234 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(holding that Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be treated as the foreign state itself; thus, 
plaintiffs could not collect punitive damages against MOIS or Iran); Dammarell v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 105, 199 (D.D.C. 2003), vacated, 404 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D.D.C. 
2005); Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13, 24 n.1 (D.D.C. 2002); 
Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1249 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 1997). But see Campuzano 
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 279 (D.D.C. 2003) (awarding punitive damages 
of $300 million against Iran for an extremely heinous bombing). See Strauss, supra note 2, at 
697-98, 701-03; see also, Peterson, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (discussion of lack of punitive damages). 
 97. The term “state sponsor of terrorism” means “a country the government of which the 
Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act 
of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2371), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), or any other provision of 
law, is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(h). The U.S. State Department publishes its list of designated state 
sponsors of terrorism annually. The list currently includes Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and 
Syria; Iraq and Libya are not longer so designated. See 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(A)(2002); see also CRS 
REPORT, supra note 34, at 5 n.14. 
 98. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 694-95. 
 99. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(a)(2). 
 100. See also CRS REPORT, supra note 34, at 45. 
 101. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(b). The previous provision in the FSIA subjected the statute of 
limitations to equitable tolling, “including the period during which the foreign state was immune 
from suit.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(f) (2006). Courts have differed as to whether to interpret the 
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In order to recover under this Act, the claimant or victim must 
be a U.S. national, member of the armed forces, or an employee or 
contractor of the U.S. government acting in the scope of employment 
at the time the act occurred.102 This requirement represents an 
expansion of jurisdiction beyond U.S. nationals as potential plaintiffs, 
enlarging the class of persons protected by the statute to include 
members of the armed forces and contract security personnel who 
may be foreign nationals.103 It leaves unchanged the requirement that 
if the acts complained of occurred in a foreign state, plaintiffs must 
have given the foreign state “a reasonable opportunity” to arbitrate 
the claim.104 The Act uses standard definitions of “torture,” “hostage 
taking,” “aircraft sabotage,” and “material support or resources,” as 
defined elsewhere in previous statutes (e.g., the International 
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages).105 
In a measure to preserve assets, the filing of a lawsuit under this 
provision: 
shall have the effect of establishing a lien of lis pendens upon any 
real property or tangible personal property located within the 
judicial district that is . . . (A) subject to attachment in aid of 
execution . . . (B) located within that judicial district; and (C) titled 
in the name of any defendant, or titled in the name of any entity 
controlled by any defendant if such notice contains a statement 
listing such controlled entity.106 
This broad measure seeks to protect potential assets for future 
collection by creating an automatic lien on all real or tangible 
personal property in the name or control of the defendant state 
sponsor of terrorism without the usual requirements of specificity and 
notice.107 Ordinarily the lis pendens applies to specific property at 
issue in the dispute, which must be described with sufficient 
 
equitable tolling provision to extend the statute of limitations to 10 years beyond the enactment 
of the original 1605(a)(7) in 1996. See CRS REPORT, supra note 34, at 45 n.157. 
 102. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(a)(2)(ii). 
 103. See CRS REPORT, supra note 34, at 44 n.155 (citing cases in which some judges, despite 
absence of language in FSIA excluding service-members and their families from suing under the 
terrorism exception, have applied a test to determine whether service-members are serving in a 
non-combatant role). 
 104. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(a)(2)(iii). However, in practice it is uncommon for foreign states 
to arbitrate these claims.  See Strauss, supra note 2, at 695 n.86. 
 105. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(h). 
 106. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(g)(1). 
 107. Id. See CRS REPORT, supra note 34, at 46. 
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specificity to put third parties on notice as potential purchasers.108 But 
this mechanism was believed to be necessary to prevent terrorist 
nations which have assets within the United States from moving them 
to prevent levy by victims of terrorism after their judgments have 
been entered. 
Most significant for collection efforts in enforcing a judgment, 
plaintiffs no longer need to show economic control over the targeted 
property or a revenue stream to a foreign country. Under this new 
provision, the judgment may be executed on the property “regardless 
of—”: 
(A) the level of economic control over the property by the 
government of the foreign state; 
(B) whether the profits of the property go to that government; 
(C) the degree to which officials of that government manage 
the property or otherwise control its daily affairs; 
(D) whether that government is the sole beneficiary in interest 
of the property; or 
(E) whether establishing the property as a separate entity 
would entitle the foreign state to benefits in United States 
courts while avoiding its obligations.109 
This provision effectively overrides the application of the 1983 
Supreme Court case of First National Bank v. Banco Para El 
Comercio Exterior de Cuba110 to judgments against designated 
terrorist states. Banco de Cuba held that “duly created 
instrumentalities of a foreign state are to be accorded a presumption 
of independent status,” which could be overcome under the same 
equitable principles that would justify “piercing the corporate veil” 
(e.g., “alter ego” or use of corporation to perpetuate fraud or 
injustice).111 Plaintiffs attempting to collect upon their judgments from 
the U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks have faced the obstacle of this 
presumption and complained that Cuba and Iran have hidden 
terrorist assets in commercial entities.112 The Act removes from the 
 
 108. See CRS REPORT, supra note 34, at 46-47 (citing 54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens §§ 10, 11, 31, 34 
(1987)). Because it is unclear whether the property will be sufficiently described to afford 
prospective purchasers adequate notice, the due process rights of these third parties may be 
implicated. See id. at 46-47. 
 109. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610(g)(1) (West 2008) (emphasis added). 
 110. First Nat’l Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983). 
 111. Id. at 627, 629. 
 112. See, e.g., CRS REPORT, supra note 34, at 47-49 & nn.168-69. 
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victims the burden of specifying targets and allows access to 
commercial assets to help them receive justice and recover damages.113 
Yet another obstacle to recovery has been removed, as the U.S. 
government can no longer make its IEEPA or other funds immune 
from collection.114 The Act explicitly states that: 
[any such] property of a foreign state, or agency or instrumentality 
of a foreign state . . . shall not be immune from attachment in aid of 
execution, or execution, upon a judgment entered under section 
1605A because the property is regulated by the United States 
Government by reason of action taken against that foreign state 
under the Trading with the Enemy Act or the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act.115 
However, this attachment power is subject to the court’s authority to 
prevent the impairment of an interest held by a third-party joint-
property-holder who is not liable in the action.116 
Interestingly enough, the law is to be applied to pending cases, to 
related actions, and, retroactively, to suits dismissed for lack of a 
cause of action under 1605 if filed within 60 days of its enactment.117 
This provision thus restarted the clock for victims of terrorism whose 
cases were dismissed under the old provision, allowing them to re-file 
their cases in a U.S. District Court within the 60-day period 
commencing on January 28, 2008.118 Moreover, defendants cannot 
claim res judicata, collateral estoppel, statute of limitations, or other 
such defenses ordinarily available under common law.119 
 
 113. Press Release, Senator Lautenberg, supra note 84. 
 114. The United States Department of Justice has used sovereign immunity to preclude 
Iranian assets from execution of judgments by victims of terrorism, notwithstanding the 
authorizing legislation to grant access to those assets. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
(TRIA), Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 201, 116 Stat. 2322, 2337 (subjecting the blocked assets of a 
terrorist party and any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party to execution or 
attachment in order to satisfy a judgment against them for any claim based on an act of 
terrorism); see also Strauss, supra note 2, at 734-38 (discussing cases interpreting the TRIA). But 
see CRS REPORT, supra note 34, at 49-50 (distinguishing “blocked” assets under the TRIA from 
“regulated” assets under this new provision). 
 115. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610(g)(2). 
 116. Id. § 1610(g)(3). 
 117. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, 
§1083(c)(1)-(3), 122 Stat. 3, 342-43 (2008). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. This provision may raise problems of a Constitutional dimension, such as the 
legitimacy of Congress’ authority to remove these common law defenses.  See Republic of 
Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 677-79 (2004) (deferring to Congress in allowing retroactive 
application of FSIA to conduct that occurred prior to its enactment). But see CRS REPORT, 
supra note 34, at 51-52 (raising the possibility that, to the extent it requires the courts to reopen 
final judgments or reinstate vacated judgments, this provision may be an improper exercise of 
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Due to the Administration’s concerns that the U.S. government’s 
reconstruction efforts in Iraq would be hampered by judgments 
against its previous government, which led President Bush to veto the 
original bill, the final statute includes an exception for Iraq at the 
President’s discretion.120 It permits the President to exempt the 
government of Iraq from any provision “if the President determines 
that—” 
(A) the waiver is in the national security interest of the United 
States; 
(B) the waiver will promote the reconstruction of, the 
consolidation of democracy in, and the relations of the United 
States with, Iraq; and 
(C) Iraq continues to be a reliable ally of the United States and 
partner in combating acts of international terrorism.121 
However, the provision continues with a statement of the “sense of 
the Congress that the President, acting through the Secretary of State, 
should work with the Government of Iraq on a state-to-state basis to 
ensure compensation for any meritorious claims based on terrorist 
acts committed by the Saddam Hussein regime against individuals” 
who cannot obtain redress in U.S. courts due to the exercise of this 
waiver.122 And by putting the burden on the President to notify 
Congress in writing of the basis of the waiver,123 Congress clearly 
seeks to place the presumption in favor of the victims of terrorist acts. 
The new law, signed by President Bush on January 28, 2008 and 
originally sponsored by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg (D-NJ) and 
Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), represents a bipartisan effort 
supported by many U.S. legislators.124 “I am pleased we were able to 
 
judicial powers by Congress; and questioning whether abrogation of legal defenses of other 
parties could raise constitutional due process and separation of powers issues). 
 120. See supra note 84. 
 121. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 § 1083(d)(1). 
 122. Id. § 1083(d)(4). 
 123. Id. § 1083 d(3) 
 124. “The original bill (S.1944) ha[d] an impressive bipartisan list of 30 cosponsors, 
including Senators Robert Menendez (D-NJ), Trent Lott (R-MS), Joseph Biden (D-DE), John 
Cornyn (R-TX ), Hillary Clinton (D-NY), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Diane Feinstein (D-CA), 
Joseph Lieberman (I-CT), Charles Schumer (D-NY), Norm Coleman (R-MN), Robert Casey 
(D-PA), Susan Collins (R-ME), Ted Stevens (R-AK), Max Baucus (D-MT), Sherrod Brown 
(D-OH), Richard Burr (R-NC), Elizabeth Dole (R-NC), James Inhoffe (R-OK), Carl Levin (D-
MI), Bill Nelson (D-FL), Arlen Specter (R-PA), Sam Brownback (R-KS), Thomas Carper (D-
DE), Jim DeMint (R-SC), John Ensign (R-NV), Johnny Isakson (R-GA), Mel Martinez (R-
FL), Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), Debbie Stabenow (D-MI), and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI).” 
Press Release, Senator Lautenberg, supra note 84. The final bill, spearheaded by 
Representatives John Conyers (D-MI), Ike Skelton (D-MO), Robert Andrews (D-NJ), and Jim 
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work with the administration on this legislation which gives the 
victims of terrorism and their families the ability to seek legal 
redress,” said Senator Specter. “This bill reaffirms that the United 
States will not tolerate state sponsored terrorism.”125 As discussed in 
detail above, “the law will give victims their day in court and help 
them pursue the assets of countries that support terrorism.”126  
Already word has reached the victims of terrorism as they look 
forward to a new era in receiving their damage awards at last. Lynn 
Derbyshire, who serves as the national spokesperson for The Beirut 
Families, declared: 
It’s taken a long time to get to this day—24 painful, grief-filled 
years—but now the victims and the families of the Beirut Marine 
Corps Barracks Bombing, and victims of terrorism everywhere, can 
begin to heal, because we can once again have hope for the future.  
Before yesterday, state-sponsors of terrorism could avoid being 
held accountable for their actions.  That is no longer the case.127  
Victims of terrorism and their families have praised the new law and 
voiced their intention to put it quickly into action: “Our focus now 
turns back to the court system, where we intend to move vigorously 
and rapidly to identify and attach the $2.6 billion in Iranian assets” 
awarded by the U.S. court to the victims and their families.128 
Under the 60 day re-filing provision, the “family members of the 
17 sailors killed in the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen [in 2000 have 
sought] to reopen their lawsuit seeking more than $100 million in 
damages from Sudan.”129 In the original case, the judge ordered Sudan 
to pay approximately $8 million for lost wages and earning potential, 
 
Saxton (R-NJ), had comparable support in the House of Representatives. See, e.g., Beirut 
Families Applaud Presidential Signing of Landmark Legislation Enabling Victims of State 
Sponsored Terrorism to Seek Claims Against Hidden Assets, REUTERS, Jan. 29, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS227270+29-Jan-2008+PRN20080129 
[hereinafter Beirut Families]. 
 125. Press Release, Senator Lautenberg, supra note 84. 
 126. Bush Signs Bill Designed to Help Victims of State-Sponsored Terrorism, The Criminal 
Division, Feb. 3, 2008, http://www.criminaldivision.com/articles/496/1/Bush-Signs-Bill-Designed-
to-Help-Victims-Of-State-Sponsored-Terrorism/State-Sponsored-Terrorism-Bill--Full 
Story.html (reprinted with permission of FED agent). 
 127. Beirut Families, supra note 124 (statement of Lynn Smith Derbyshire, whose brother 
Captain Vincent Smith was killed in the 1983 Beirut bombing, on behalf of the families of U.S. 
servicemen killed or injured in the bombing). 
 128. Id. See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F. Supp. 2d 25, 60 (D.D.C. 2007); supra 
notes 40-43 and accompanying text. 
 129. USS Cole Families Seek Suit Rehearing, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2008, 
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20080204/uss-cole-families-seek-suit-rehearing.htm [hereinafter 
USS Cole Families]. 
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but denied plaintiffs’ request for damages for loss of consortium, loss 
of solatium, loss of society, and mental anguish and emotional distress 
because the FSIA did not provide a cause of action and plaintiffs’ 
claims were founded upon the more limited Death on the High Seas 
Act.130 The families have asked the judge to reopen the case on the 
grounds that the new law, which permits the courts to reopen older 
terrorism cases, provides for punitive damages, pain and suffering, 
and emotional distress.131 Moreover, they are hoping for assistance in 
retrieving the $8 million from U.S. banks that hold $60 million in 
Sudanese assets, but the banks claim that the U.S. government has 
frozen the assets.132 With the recognition that state sponsors of 
terrorism “should not be allowed to hide their assets from the victims 
of terrorism,” the new law is being hailed as a “definitive step toward 
ending terrorism and holding terrorists accountable for their heinous 
crimes.”133 
III. A FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT 
Despite the assistance of Congress and U.S. courts, U.S. victims 
of global terrorism and their surviving family members have 
experienced enormous difficulty in enforcing their judgments against 
terrorist organizations and state sponsors of terrorism. The new U.S. 
law will lead to greater success in maintaining their claims and will aid 
their efforts in levying upon domestic assets tied to terrorism. 
However, “[t]he total amount of judgments against terrorist States far 
exceeds the assets of debtor States known to exist within the 
jurisdiction of U.S. courts.”134 If the assets of these groups could be 
attached and collected overseas, the war on terrorism might be waged 
more effectively, an effort that would call for the support of the 
international community through comity and the rule of law.135 
Support for this proposition comes from examining the economic 
perspective of several experts and the precedents set by the UN 
Security Council in dealing with matters of international terrorism. 
Taken together, they lay the foundation for a more global recognition 
of these civil judgments. 
 
 130. Rux v. Republic of Sudan, 495 F. Supp. 2d 541, 567, 569 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
 131. USS Cole Families, supra note 129. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Beirut Families, supra note 124 (quoting Judith C. Young and Lynn Smith Derbyshire, 
respectively, who lost family members in the Beirut bombing of the Marine barracks). 
 134. CRS REPORT, supra note 34, at 2. 
 135. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 741. 
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A. International Seizure of Terrorist Assets: The Economic 
Perspective 
Analyzing terrorism using the same tools that economists use to 
study the business cycle, researchers have discovered that cycles in 
terrorism occur due to “copycat” effects (such as the anthrax attacks), 
the attack/counter-attack process, and economies of scale in planning 
and executing attacks.136 Periods of high terrorism when terrorists 
expend their resources are followed by low-terrorism periods during 
which they replenish their resources, including weapons, funds, and 
new recruits. Using standard economic theory to predict terrorist 
behavior, two economists explained that “[t]ransnational terrorist 
groups attempt to economize on their scarce resources in a manner 
similar to that of everyday business firms. If the costs of performing 
one type of terrorist attack increase, rational terrorists will substitute 
into other similar types of attacks.”137 Their research has implications 
for the most effective ways to combat terrorism, concluding that 
“defensive policies do little to thwart terrorism” because: 
Terrorists look for the weakest link, and it is too difficult for a 
democratic society to effectively defend itself against all possible 
types of attacks. When there is too much attention paid to one kind 
of vulnerability, a weakness in security can be exploited elsewhere. 
Instead, the most successful policies have been those that reduce 
the ability of terrorists to acquire resources (including weapons, 
funds and personnel). Actions to freeze terrorist assets and reduce 
terrorist numbers are better at curbing terrorism than concentrating 
on select kinds of events or targets. By going after terrorist 
resources, the authorities thwart all forms of attacks; by focusing on 
a specific event, the authorities encourage a substitution among 
modes of attacks.138 
Their research thus supports a proactive strategy of fighting terrorism 
through financial measures aimed at depleting the terrorists of their 
assets and resources. 
Many contemporary scholars corroborate the value of utilizing 
the financial system in the war against terrorism. John B. Taylor, as 
Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Affairs from 2001 to 
 
 136. Lauren Bocchino, For Terrorists, It’s All About Resources, 6 U. ALA. RES. MAG. 
ONLINE, 2002,  http://research.ua.edu/archive2002/terrorism.html. 
 137. Id. (quoting Dr. Walter Enders, professor of economics). 
 138. Id.; see also WALTER ENDERS & TODD SANDLER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
TERRORISM (2006); Todd Sandler & Walter Enders, An Economic Perspective on Transnational 
Terrorism, 20 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 301 (2003), available at http://www.cba.ua.edu/ ~wenders/ 
EJPE_Sandler_Enders.pdf. 
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2005, formed international coalitions to freeze the financial assets of 
terrorists worldwide.139 He describes the merits of the financial 
approach as the technique of preventing or halting transfers of funds, 
thereby “freezing” the assets of people or groups that the President 
designates as terrorist, and taking action against banks that deal with 
those who fund terrorist organizations.140 On an international scale, 
Taylor reports that 172 countries participated in the freezing of $137 
million of assets very soon after 9/11, even though 120 of those 
countries had to change their laws in order to do so.141 Not only does 
this deplete the terrorists’ resources, it is also an effective method for 
tracking the assets and money of the terrorists to locate them and 
identify their networks. Moreover, this tactic involves less extensive 
privacy invasions than direct surveillance methods.142 While much of 
the current focus in the United States has been on the military and 
the political aspects of the war, Taylor emphasizes this financial 
component as “an essential part of the war on terror.”143 
A five-year effort to curtail terrorist money is having an impact, 
according to U.S. officials and terrorism experts.144 Reporting on the 
reduced flow of terrorism money, experts note the increasing trend of 
terrorists using cash couriers to smuggle money across borders.145 
Analysts at the U.S. Treasury track terrorist financing, including cash 
smuggling, through financial and banking records, which they use to 
identify terrorist financing entities and generate sanctions to block 
 
 139. Bill Steigerwald, Bankers vs. Terrorists, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV., Jan. 28, 2007, 
available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/opinion/halfpagebooks/s_49051 
5.html (interview with John B. Taylor, currently an economics professor at Stanford University). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See generally Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and Terrorism, 49 B.C. L. REV. 125 (2008) 
(arguing that there should be a rebuttable presumption that anyone who provides material 
support to terrorists was predisposed to do so; thus, entrapment defense should not apply, 
reducing the need for intrusive surveillance). 
 143. Id. See generally JOHN B. TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCIAL WARRIORS: THE UNTOLD 
STORY OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD (2007) (chronicling his 
experiences as head of U.S. Treasury Department’s international finance division including 
freezing terrorist assets worldwide, planning the financial reconstruction of Afghanistan, and 
overseeing the development of a new currency in Iraq). 
 144. John Diamond, Flow of Terror Funds Being Choked, U.S. Says, USA TODAY, June 19, 
2006, at 9A. 
 145. Id. (statements of John McLaughlin, deputy CIA director from 2000 to 2004, testifying 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Stuart Levey, United States Treasury 
Department’s Undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence). 
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these funds.146 The Treasury has been urging foreign governments to 
launch similar “financial intelligence units.”147 Moreover, “the 
imposition of sanctions by the United States and its international 
partners against terrorists, terrorist organizations and their support 
structures is a powerful tool with far-reaching effects that extend 
beyond the blocking of terrorist assets.”148 Identifying these 
individuals and organizations exposes and isolates them from access 
to the U.S. financial system and, with a UN designation, the global 
financial system.149 A Treasury official explains this strategy: “A 
suicide bomber is difficult to deter. A wealthy individual or an Islamic 
charity, however, might be deterred by the threat of sanctions, loss of 
access to financial markets or criminal charges.”150 
B.  Freezing Terrorist Assets as an Alternative to War: The United 
Nations Security Council Approach 
As the international community has increasingly disfavored a 
military response to terrorism, the United Nations Security Council is 
leaning towards financial warfare: imposing economic sanctions and 
freezing the assets of terrorist groups. To be sure, the United Nations 
generally aims to promote international security by intervening in 
conflicts between nations in the hopes of avoiding war. The Security 
Council is a subset of the UN charged with maintaining international 
peace and security.151 An analysis of the precedents of the Security 
 
 146. Id. But see Kevin McCoy, Audit: IRS Can’t Fully Screen Terrorists, USA TODAY, May 
29, 2007, at 1B (warning that a new federal government audit reveals IRS screening of tax-
exempt organizations is inefficient and incomplete; but reporting plans by IRS Tax Exempt and 
Government Entities Division to implement an effective computer-based system to better 
screen these organizations for potential terrorist activities). 
 147. From 1995 to 2005, the number of these “financial intelligence units” has increased 
from 14 to 101, according to the Government Accountability Office. See Diamond, supra note 
144. 
 148. See REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ASSETS, supra note 58, at 6. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Diamond, supra note 144 (statement of Stuart Levey, United States Treasury 
Department’s Undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence). 
 151. The United Nations Security Council has five permanent members – the People’s 
Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
– and ten non-permanent members that are elected for two-year terms by the UN General 
Assembly. The non-permanent members for 2008 are Belgium, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, 
Croatia, Indonesia, Italy, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Panama, South Africa, and Vietnam. Each 
Security Council resolution is voted on by the fifteen members of the Security Council; 
decisions on substantive matters require nine affirmative votes, including all of the five 
permanent members (i.e., none of the permanent members exercise their power to veto). See 
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Council will demonstrate that it has favored economic actions and, in 
particular, the freezing of terrorist assets as an alternative to war. 
Furthermore, this approach has effectively established an 
international public policy in support of unified financial methods 
against terrorism. 
The Security Council is the only UN body whose actions are 
legally binding on all 192 UN member states.152 In its history, the 
Security Council has investigated numerous threats to international 
peace and issued almost two thousand resolutions, but has only 
authorized two major wars: the Korean War in 1950 and the Gulf 
War in 1991.153 This record reflects its goal “to unite our strength to 
maintain international peace and security.”154 The UN Charter sets 
forth among its purposes: 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to 
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal 
of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression 
or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful 
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international 
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.155 
Thus, this international body is duly authorized to take action 
towards ensuring international security,156 but it predominantly favors 
economic over military solutions to problems of global security. 
The Security Council has been dealing with terrorism issues since 
the 1990s, passing several resolutions over the years in response to 
 
U.N. Security Council Members, http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp (last visited Dec. 23, 2008); 
U.N. Charter arts. 23, 27. 
 152. U.N. Charter arts. 25, 48 (“Under the Charter, all Members of the United Nations 
agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. While other organs of the 
United Nations make recommendations to Governments, the Council alone has the power to 
take decisions which Member States are obligated under the Charter to carry out.”); see also 
UN Summit Supports Millennium Goals, Condemns Terrorism, ENV’T NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 15, 
2005, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/sep2005/2005-09-15-02.asp [hereinafter UN Summit 
Supports Millennium Goals]. 
 153. S.C. Res. 84, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1588 (July 7, 1950); S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 
(Nov. 29, 1990); UN Security Council, Resolutions, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ 
unsc_resolutions.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2008). See SCHAFFER ET AL., supra note 49, at 55-56. 
See generally EDWARD C. LUCK, UN SECURITY COUNCIL: PRACTICE AND PROMISE (2006); 
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY (David M. Malone 
ed. 2004).  
 154. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 155. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1. 
 156. See generally VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 271-82 (2007). 
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terrorism.157 In the 1990s, these resolutions “took the form of 
sanctions against States considered to have links to certain acts of 
terrorism, [for example,] Libya (1992), Sudan (1996), and the Taliban 
(1999 - expanded to include Al-Qaida in 2000 by Resolution 1333).”158 
These sanctions were consistent with its responses to other acts of 
aggression by member States, which favored economic pressure over 
military reaction.159 Most significant have been the resolutions passed 
within the past decade regarding the freezing of terrorist assets. 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, passed in October 
1999, requires UN member states to freeze assets controlled by the 
Taliban, a group of Sunni Muslim fundamentalist insurgents in 
Afghanistan.160 Paragraph 4(b) of the resolution asserts that all states 
must: 
Freeze funds and other financial resources, including funds derived 
or generated from property owned or controlled directly or 
indirectly by the Taliban . . . and ensure that neither they nor any 
other funds or financial resources so designated are made 
available . . . to or for the benefit of the Taliban or any undertaking 
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Taliban . . . .161 
As support for this economic measure, the Security Council cited its 
commitment to sovereignty for Afghanistan, its “deep concern” for 
the Taliban’s violation of human rights, and “its conviction that the 
suppression of international terrorism is essential for the maintenance 
of international peace and security.”162 Instead of calling for military 
action to achieve its end of impeding international terrorism, this 
resolution exercises the Security Council’s authority to cause member 
states to band together and restrict a specific terrorist group’s access 
to funds. When the Security Council thereby “urges all States to 
 
 157. See UN Action to Counter Terrorism, Security Council Resolutions, 
http://www.un.org/terrorism/sc-res.shtml (last visited Dec. 23, 2008). 
 158. See UN Action to Counter Terrorism, Security Council Actions to Counter Terrorism, 
http://www.un.org/terrorism/securitycouncil.shtml (last visited Dec. 23, 2008) [hereinafter UN 
Action to Counter Terrorism]. 
 159. For example, the Security Council issued Resolution 661 in 1990 after it condemned 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Instead of authorizing war, the resolution imposed economic 
sanctions on Iraq. All UN member states were required to prevent: the import of products from 
Iraq or Kuwait; activities by nationals of their territories to promote the export of goods from 
Iraq or Kuwait, including any transfer of funds; and the sale of products and weapons by 
nationals of their territories to persons in Iraq or Kuwait. S.C. Res. 661, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990). 
 160. S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 4(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. pmbl. 
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cooperate with efforts to fulfil [sic] the demand,”163 this resolution 
further establishes a unified public policy to employ economic means 
to promote peace and counter terrorism. 
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York, 
Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania, the Security Council issued 
another resolution aimed at impeding terrorist efforts. Resolution 
1373 was adopted on September 28, 2001, broadening the scope of the 
terrorist assets that member states were obliged to freeze: not only 
those assets directly or indirectly controlled by the Taliban, but also 
those of “persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or 
participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities 
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of 
persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such 
persons and entities . . . .”164 The resolution also calls on all UN 
member states to criminalize the financing of terrorism,165 deny safe 
haven to terrorists,166 bring terrorists to justice,167 and ensure that all 
terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offenses in domestic 
law.168 Like Resolution 1267, Resolution 1373 reaffirms that any act of 
international terrorism poses a threat to international security and 
that the Security Council’s commitment to promoting peace is best 
achieved through economic means. 
However, in combating terrorism, the freezing of assets overseas 
has not gone far enough.  Since September 11, 2001, the United States 
has been at the forefront of a global war on terror. The country has 
not been alone in this endeavor, and one of its most important allies 
has been the United Nations. UN Resolutions 1267 and 1373 present 
the guidelines and avenues for undertaking the lofty task of fighting 
terrorism. But critics point to ineffective enforcement mechanisms 
and an insufficient infrastructure as undercutting much of the 
resolutions’ stated purpose.169 Consider, for example, that in the midst 
of fighting a multi-billion dollar military campaign against Al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban, the United States has also successfully frozen over 
 
 163. Id. ¶ 5; see also S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (Oct. 19, 1999) (laying additional 
foundation by directing countries to work together to prevent and suppress all terrorist acts). 
 164. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
 165. Id. ¶ 1(b). 
 166. Id. ¶ 2(c). 
 167. Id. ¶ 2(e). 
 168. Id. 
 169. See generally, e.g., Eric Rosand, Current Developments: The Security Council’s Efforts 
to Monitor the Implementation of Al-Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 745 (2004). 
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$16 million in assets of groups categorized as Specially Designated 
Global Terrorists, Specially Designated Terrorists, and Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations.170 In addition, the U.S. has blocked $310 of 
the $412 million in assets (located within U.S. jurisdiction) relating to 
five designated state sponsors of terrorism.171 Comparatively, the 
entire international community has frozen a mere $136 million of 
those persons and entities with known ties to terrorist organizations, 
by way of blocking orders of 150 member states.172 As many as 40 
countries and jurisdictions have not issued such orders, despite being 
legally obligated by the UN charter to impose such sanctions.173 
Another purpose of Resolution 1267 was to “monitor states’ 
efforts to implement Council-imposed sanctions on Taliban-
controlled Afghanistan for its support of Osama bin Laden and Al 
Qaeda.”174 Pursuant to the passage of this resolution, the Security 
Council established a “counter-terrorism tool” that was “tasked with 
monitoring the sanctions against the Taliban (and subsequently al-
Qaeda as of 2000).”175 The 1267 Committee consists of all fifteen 
member states that make up the Security Council, each one 
represented by a chosen diplomat. These diplomats were not, 
however, experts in the major substantive areas of the mandate (i.e., 
terrorist financing, arms trafficking, border controls, counter-
terrorism and related legal issues) and in 2001 the Secretary General 
appointed the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, an 
eight-member group made up of experts in those areas. Similarly, 
after September 11, Resolution 1373 set forth a series of counter-
terrorism requisites on all states and created the Counter Terrorism 
Committee (“CTC”).176 The establishment of the CTC was 
 
 170. REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ASSETS, supra note 58, at 6. 
 171. Id. at 15 tbl.4 (using data from 2006). An additional $600,000 of the OFAC blocked 
funds are held in foreign branches of U.S. banks. Id. at 14 tbl.2. 
 172. Rosand, supra note 169, at 755. “By the end of 2005, the Security Council had frozen 
the assets of 347 individuals and 119 entities.” Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in from 
the Cold War: Intelligence and International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1071, 1111 (2006) 
(examining the use of information in this new regime along with the expansion of the powers of 
the Security Council). 
 173. See Rosand, supra note 169, at 755. However, “as of March 24, 2004, more than 170 
countries had issued orders freezing or seizing approximately $200 million” in financial assets 
related to terrorism. See id. n.67. 
 174. Id. at 747. 
 175. UN Action to Counter Terrorism, supra note 158. 
 176. See Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/ (last 
visited March 29, 2008) (“While the ultimate aim of the Committee is to increase the ability of 
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particularly vital to the success of this resolution, as it was to be the 
major-capacity building mechanism that would give the states the 
capability to implement and enforce the resolution’s mandates.177 
While Resolutions 1267 and 1373 both represent the admirable 
efforts of the international community in the battle against terrorism, 
they have been criticized by some early observers as ineffective, 
largely political tools.178 For example, one of the major responsibilities 
of the 1267 Committee is to maintain a list of terrorist organizations.179 
“Most criticism of the targeted sanctions regime focuses on alleged 
violations of the rights of persons whose assets have been frozen, or 
the inappropriateness of the Security Council ‘legislating’ by issuing 
binding orders of general application without adequate checks on its 
powers.”180 The criteria for the designation of individuals and entities 
on the list are intentionally vague and the lack of sharing of 
intelligence information makes the removal of a name difficult once 
so designated.181 The objectivity of the list is further impaired by its 
lack of identifiers; language experts and name-searching software 
designers maintain that it is extremely difficult to compile a 
satisfactory database of names due to “the transliteration of 
characters from one alphabet to another, variations in the structure of 
names due to cultural origins, and variant spellings of names.”182 Some 
say that the absence of proper identification and the ability both to 
 
States to fight terrorism, it is not a sanctions body nor does it maintain a list of terrorist 
organizations or individuals.”). 
 177. See Rosand, supra note 169, at 745-46. See generally Eric Rosand, Security Council 
Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 333 (2003) (discussing Resolution 1373 and the work of the CTC). 
 178. See Rosand, supra note 169, at 760. 
 179. See U.N. Sec. Council, Al-Qaida & Taliban Sanctions Comm., The Consolidated List 
Established and Maintained by the 1267 Committee with Respect to Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, 
and the Taliban and Other Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Associated with 
Them, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pd-f/consolidatedlist.pdf (last visited Dec. 25, 
2008) (listing 142 individuals belonging to or associated with the Taliban, and 253 individuals 
and 96 entities belonging to or associated with al Qaida). 
 180. Chesterman, supra note 172, at 1111. See also Jose Alvarez, Editorial Comment, 
Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 873, 874 (2003) (analyzing the 
Security Council’s counterterrorism efforts—“imposing financial sanctions on designated 
individuals and organizations and a welter of other obligations on states . . . that rare 
phenomenon in international law: legally binding regulation, backed by the possibility of real 
enforcement action, imposed on all states by a global international organ engaged in a 
continuous legislative enterprise by virtue of delegated power and subject to no geographic or 
temporal limitation”—as an example of global hegemonic international law). 
 181. Chesterman, supra note 172, at 1114, 1118. 
 182. Rosand, supra note 169, at 751. 
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receive confidential information appropriately and to assess its 
accuracy conveys the impression that the names submitted to the list 
are sometimes done so for domestic political concerns, and that their 
link to al-Qaeda is questionable.183 These credibility issues threaten to 
undermine the regime’s effectiveness as some states have refused to 
implement the asset freezes.184 Moreover, this deficiency reflects the 
broader problem of poor information sharing in the efforts to fight 
international terrorism that has led to calls for an organized and 
enforceable commitment from all member countries.185 
The monitoring group established by the Secretary General in 
2001 has had some major shortcomings as well. The group was 
charged with monitoring the implementation of the global sanctions 
imposed after September 11.186 Unfortunately, the monitoring group 
has not always been responsive to the requests made of it by the 
Committee. For instance, the group at times did not coordinate its 
visits to member states with the Committee in advance, and therefore 
did not concentrate on the areas that the Committee felt required the 
most consideration.187 Issues also have arisen concerning “the lack of 
transparency and sloppiness in the group’s work.”188 Perhaps most 
importantly, the monitoring group based its reports predominantly 
upon “open-source news reporting,” seemingly deficient in 
“sophisticated analysis.”189 
 
 183. See id. at 751-52; see also Chesterman, supra note 172, at 1115-18 (discussing problems 
with the criteria for designation of individuals on the list for the freezing of assets and the lack 
of a de-listing procedure). 
 184. Chesterman, supra note 172, at 1119 (“It now seems probable that the greatest 
hindrance to the regime’s effectiveness will not be challenges from courts but the reluctance of 
states to add to the list.”). 
 185. Ronald K. Noble, All Terrorism Is Local, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006, at WK 11 
(arguing that the failure to share information about terrorists with global law enforcement in 
international databases is systemic and needs to be changed through international cooperation); 
see also Rosand, supra note 169, at 752 (noting that “[n]ot all states regularly transmit the list to 
their border services and other relevant domestic authorities charged with implementing the 
sanctions. Thus, even if the process for adding names to the consolidated list is improved, unless 
there is increased state compliance in this area, such improvements can have only a limited 
positive effect on the implementation of the measures.”). 
 186. S.C. Res. 1390, ¶¶ 6, 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 16, 2002). In Resolution 1390, the 
Security Council assigned this group to monitor and report on the implementation of its global 
sanctions for twelve months. Upon the expiration of the group’s mandate in January 2003, the 
Security Council extended this charge in Resolution 1455. S.C. Res. 1455, ¶¶ 9, 11, 13, 14, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1455 (Jan. 17, 2003). 
 187. Rosand, supra note 169, at 754. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
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Finally, the roles of the 1267 Committee and the CTC have been 
effectively diminished by an overwhelming lack of compliance. The 
Security Council requested that all member states issue a report to 
the Committee, in writing, of the steps they have taken to implement 
the measures under each relevant resolution, but the term 
“requested” negated the legal obligation to act in accordance with the 
Council’s wishes.190 In fact, more than one-third of member states 
initially failed to submit such a report.191 Many within the United 
Nations and international community viewed the CTC as a non-
threatening body because its focus had been on capacity building and 
not judging states. The monitoring group issued a telling statement 
when it wrote: “without a much tougher and more comprehensive 
resolution, in which the Security Council requests States take the 
mandated measures and obliges them to cooperate fully with the 
Committee. . ., little or no progress will be achieved with regard to the 
[Al-Qaeda/Taliban] sanctions regime.”192 
Many of these early criticisms have since been addressed as the 
resolutions continue to be strengthened.  For example, commencing 
in March 2005, the CTC began conducting site visits to determine 
whether member states are fully implementing counter-terrorism 
mandates, rather than relying exclusively on their reports.193 “This has 
increased the committee’s capacity to provide independent evaluation 
of counterterrorism capacity needs.”194 In addition, the Security 
Council has made it compulsory for member states to submit reports 
 
 190. Id. at 758. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 760 (quoting U.N. Sec. Council, Al-Qaida & Taliban Sanctions Comm., Second 
Report of the Monitoring Group Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1363 
(2001) and Extended by Resolutions 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003), on Sanctions Against Al-
Qaida, the Taliban and Individuals and Entities Associated with Them, ¶ 173, U.N. Doc. 
S/2003/1070 (Nov. 3, 2003)). 
 193. David Cortright, A Critical Evaluation of the UN Counter-Terrorism Program: 
Accomplishments and Challenges, TRANSNAT’L INST., (Apr. 28-29, 2005), at 3, http://www.tni. 
org/crime-docs/cortright.pdf. 
 194. Id. See also Ellen Margrethe Løj, Chairman, Sec. Council Counter-Terrorism Comm., 
Briefing to the Security Council (Apr. 26, 2005), http://www.missionfnnewyork.um.dk/ en/menu/ 
statements/BriefingbyChairmanofCTCto-theSC.htm (reporting on the revitalized work of the 
committee and presenting framework for continuing to implement its reforms); Advisory 
Council on Int’l Aff. [AIV], Counterterrorism from an International and European Perspective, 
Advisory Report no. 49 at 22, The Hague, Sept. 2006, available at http://www.icj.org/ 
IMG/AIVReport-2007.pdf (“The practice of the CTC and its Executive Directorate (CTED) of 
conducting visits provides additional information on requirements relating to counterterrorism 
capacity.”). 
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to the CTC.195 In contrast to earlier reports, some experts recently 
have concluded that the CTC’s “efforts to collect information from 
member states on counter-terrorism capacity and implementation 
have been highly successful.”196 One observer commented: “Member 
state compliance with CTC reporting requests has been far greater 
than for any previous Security Council mandate.”197 All UN member 
states submitted to the CTC first-round reports that described their 
efforts to comply with Resolution 1373.198 The CTC’s experts 
responded to these reports by requesting explanations and additional 
information, in turn generating further submissions.199 In all, the CTC 
has received more than 550 reports, a total which is described as 
“probably the largest body of information about worldwide 
counterterrorism capacity.”200 
According to the Advisory Council on International Affairs 
(“AIV”), “[s]ubstantive compliance is obviously the key issue. The 
reports and survey indicate that states are amending their legislation 
and expanding their capacity in order to comply with UN 
standards.”201 The AIV reported that in 2003 “only some 30 states 
satisfied the then-prevailing requirements for intervening in the 
financing, transport, recruitment and equipment of terrorists,” an 
additional 60 states had “made progress,” and 70 states were 
classified as “‘willing but unable,’ for reasons such as internal conflict, 
poverty or a lack of adequate legal and administrative structures.”202  
But the AIV noted that “[f]or reasons of their own, approximately 20 
countries do absolutely nothing despite having the necessary financial 
resources. Unfortunately, some of these countries have to contend 
 
 195. See S.C. Res. 1455, supra note 186, ¶ 6. 
 196. David Cortright, Can the UN Battle Terrorism Effectively?, FOURTH FREEDOM F., 
http://www.fourthfreedo-m.org/Applications/cms.php?page_id=193 (an extended version of an 
article originally appearing in the January 2005 issue of USA Today) (examining how the 
United Nations Committee on Counter-Terrorism is working with nation states and regional 
organizations to combat terrorism multilaterally). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. (citing Rosand, supra note 177, at 337). 
 199. Cortright, supra note 196. 
 200. Id. (quoting Eric Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee: the Cornerstone of the United Nations Contribution to the Fight Against Terrorism, in 
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 603, 616 (C. 
Fijnaut, Ja. Wouters, & F. Naert eds., 2004)). 
 201. AIV, supra note 194, at 22. 
 202. Id. 
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with a great deal of terrorist activity, and their lack of commitment 
undermines the efforts of the United Nations as a whole.”203 
Still “the high levels of member state response to CTC requests 
confirm the importance many states attach to compliance with the 
UN counter-terrorism program. The reports indicate that many states 
are taking concrete steps to revise their laws and enhance their 
enforcement capacity for compliance with UN counter-terrorism 
mandates.”204 Security Council resolutions have “mobilized states for 
a campaign of nonmilitary cooperative law enforcement measures to 
combat global terrorism.”205 Accordingly, the domestic laws of the 
vast majority of member states reflect and, indeed, embody the UN’s 
counter-terrorism goals and objectives.206 
In addition, experts universally agree on the importance of 
monitoring and compliance.207 However, there are inherent limits 
because the CTC is not a sanctions committee. The most far-reaching 
measure it has at its disposal is the ability to blacklist countries that 
are late in submitting their reports, but even in this regard it exercises 
restraint.208 Moreover, the freezing of assets as a sanctions measure 
has served the function of preventing future sponsorship of terrorism 
rather than compelling people towards desirable activities or 
curtailing their own bad acts.209 Yet it must be acknowledged that 
“[b]y restricting financing, safe havens and travel options for 
individuals in the Al Qaida network, the CTC has certainly reduced 
the flow of financial assistance and has probably disrupted 
 
 203. Id. See also AIV, The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime: the Importance of an 
Integrated and Multilateral Approach, Advisory Rep. No. 47 at 13, 32, The Hague, Jan. 2006. 
 204. Cortright, supra note 196. 
 205. Id. 
 206. “The reports indicate that many states are taking concrete steps to revise their laws and 
enhance their enforcement capacity for compliance with UN counter-terrorism mandates.” Id. 
See also The Secretary General, Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy, ¶ 77, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/60/825 (Apr. 
27, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/unitingagainstterrorism-/contents.htm [hereinafter 
Uniting Against Terrorism] (“The Security Council in resolution 1373 (2001) contributed to this 
end by deciding that all States should ensure that any person who participates in the financing, 
planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in support of terrorist acts is brought to 
justice, and that such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws 
and regulations.”). 
 207. See, e.g., AIV, supra note 194, at 24. 
 208. See id. at 22. But see High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 156, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/59/565 (Dec. 1, 2004) (arguing in favor of sanctions). 
 209. Chesterman, supra note 172, at 1110. 
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operations.”210 A recent estimate sets the total figure frozen 
internationally as approximately $200 million in potential terrorist 
funding.211 
Terrorism continues to pose a global threat despite the extensive 
counter-terrorism activity worldwide. Due to the inherent 
inefficiencies in the overlapping UN bodies created in this area and 
limitations in funding available through the UN, some experts have 
proposed the formation of an independent national body for 
counterterrorism, either a separate UN agency or a global 
organization outside of the UN system.212 A report prepared by the 
AIV determined that “[c]ombating terrorism effectively is primarily 
the responsibility of national governments. Given the international 
dimension of the problem, however, international cooperation is 
more important now than ever before.”213 Certainly a financial 
approach to combating terrorism is more consistent with the UN 
Charter and resolutions, although the charter does provide a limited 
exception for self-defense.214 
Of particular significance is the precedent among these 
resolutions for direct compensation of the victims of terrorism. 
Resolution 1566, adopted in 2004, established the 1566 Working 
Group, once again comprised of all Security Council members, to 
recommend practical measures against groups and organizations 
engaged in terrorist activities.215 This resolution extended the reach of 
UN bodies beyond the groups that were subject to the 1267 
Committee’s review, namely Al-Qaida/Taliban, to the individuals, 
groups, and entities that enable and sponsor terrorist groups.216 The 
 
 210. AIV, supra note 194, at 22-23. 
 211. See WHITE HOUSE, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 1 
(Sept. 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/progress/progress_report_0903.pdf. 
 212. See Eric Rosand, The UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Efforts, in SWORDS 
INTO PLOWSHARES: BUILDING PEACE THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, 73, 81-83 (Roy S. Lee 
ed., 2006). See generally Eric Rosand, The UN-Led Multilateral Institutional Response to Jihadist 
Terrorism: Is a Global Counterterrorism Body Needed?, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 399 
(2007) (detailing the limitations of the current UN Security Council-led approach due to the 
inherent, political, administrative and budgetary challenges of operating within the UN system 
and arguing that a new international body dedicated to counterterrorism outside of, but perhaps 
related in some way to, the UN may be needed). 
 213. AIV, supra note 194, at 11. 
 214. Id. at 24-25 (“[U]nder international law, self-defense on the basis of Article 51 of the 
UN Charter is linked to a number of restrictions concerning the nature, scope, location and 
duration of the relevant measures.”). 
 215. S.C. Res. 1566, ¶¶ 9-10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004). 
 216. Id. ¶ 9. 
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practical measures to be imposed on these entities would encompass 
procedures such as: “bringing them to justice through prosecution or 
extradition, freezing their financial assets, preventing their movement 
through” territories of Member States, and preventing access to all 
types of arms and related supplies.217 Included among its charges is 
that this working group “consider the possibility of establishing an 
international fund to compensate victims of terrorist acts and their 
families, which might be financed through voluntary contributions, 
which could consist in part of assets seized from terrorist 
organizations, their members and sponsors, and submit its 
recommendations to the Council.”218 The Secretary General in a 
keynote address further emphasized the merit of such a fund.219 Thus, 
the UN Security Council has already laid the foundation for the 
approach advocated here. 
The UN stands historically united in the area of terrorism and 
the efforts to combat this global problem. On September 8, 2006, the 
Member States adopted “The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” 
which serves as “the common platform that brings together the 
counter-terrorism efforts of the various United Nations system 
entities into a common, coherent and more focused framework.”220 
Building upon an unprecedented consensus reached by world leaders 
at their 2005 World Summit to condemn terrorism,221 this strategy 
signifies the first time that nations agreed to a common strategic 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. ¶ 10; see also UN Action to Counter Terrorism, supra note 158. See generally 
SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 159-61 (Benjamin J. Goold & Liora Lazarus eds., 2007) 
(discussing the four Security Council committees on terrorism: the 1267 Committee, the 
Counter-terrorism Committee, the 1540 Committee, and the 1566 Working Group). 
 219. See Albrecht & Kilchling, supra note 34, at 15 (citing Secretary General Kofi Annan, 
Keynote Address to the Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism 
and Security: A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism (Mar. 10, 2005), http://www.un.org/apps/ 
sg/sgstats.asp?nid=1345 (noting, however, that the UN did not adopt a mandatory scheme of 
support for victims of terrorism)); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm’n on Human 
Rights Res. 2003/37, ¶ 11, E/CN.4/2003/135 (Apr. 23, 2003). 
 220. UN Action to Counter Terrorism, Coordinating Counter-terrorism Actions Within and 
Beyond the UN System, http://www.un.org/terrorism/cttaskforce.shtml/68 (last visited Dec. 26, 
2008). 
 221. UN Summit Supports Millennium Goals, supra note 152. In conjunction with the 2005 
World Summit, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1624, “Condemning in the strongest 
terms all acts of terrorism irrespective of their motivation,” as well as the incitement to such 
acts; it called on member states to prohibit by law incitement to commit terrorist acts, prevent 
such incitement, and deny safe haven to any perpetrators. S.C. Res. 1624, prmbl., ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005). 
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approach to fight terrorism worldwide.222 Upon launching this 
initiative, the President of the General Assembly declared: 
The passing of the resolution on the United Nations Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy with its annexed Plan of Action by 192 
Member States represents a common testament that we, the United 
Nations, will face terrorism head on and that terrorism in all its 
forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and 
for whatever purposes, must be condemned and shall not be 
tolerated.223 
This statement of a unified strategy strongly evidences a common 
public policy of all the nations. 
As further support for a public policy in favor of compensating 
victims of terrorism and ensuring their rights, the Council of Europe 
recently drafted guidelines on the Protection of Victims of Terrorist 
Acts, which assert that states must devise policies to ensure the 
effective protection of human life.224 The guidelines set forth 
principles for delivering support and compensation for victims, most 
significantly for addressing pain and suffering.225 Note, however, that 
the proposals only focus on compensation and fairness with respect to 
equal treatment of victims, whereas the civil action approach also 
utilizes financial means to punish and prevent terrorist acts.226 Yet a 
common core is evidenced: “Assistance, protection and compensation 
for victims of terrorism have a significant impact as a political strategy 
to counter the dehumanizing of victims, which is a significant 
component of terrorist strategies worldwide.”227 In view of this unified 
policy of the nations, the timing is ideal for international support of 
monetary actions against terrorism. Although the committees’ 
attempts to implement these resolutions may be flawed, they are 
 
 222. UN Action to Counter Terrorism, supra note 158. 
 223. UN Action to Counter Terrorism, http://www.un.org/terrorism/index.shtml (citing 
statement of Sheikha Haya Rashed Al Khalifa, President of the 61st session of the General 
Assembly Launching the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy on 19 September 2006). 
 224. See Council of Europe, Comm. of Ministers, Guidelines on the Protection of Victims of 
Terrorist Acts, princs., CM/Del/Dec(2005)917/4.2/appendix2E (Mar. 7, 2005); Albrecht & 
Kilchling, supra note 34, at 16. 
 225. Albrecht & Kilchling, supra note 34, at 17. See also Org. for Sec. & Cooperation in 
Europe [OSCE], Office for Democratic Institutions and Hum. Rts., Technical Workshop on 
Solidarity with Victims of Terrorism: Final Report, ¶ 3, ODIHR.GAL/23/06 (Mar. 9-10, 2006). 
 226. See James Kraska, Torts and Terror: Rethinking Deterrence Models and Catastrophic 
Terrorist Attack, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 361, 383 (2007) (stating “[t]he application of tort 
theory . . . offers value in . . . deterrence against . . . nuclear terrorism”). 
 227. Albrecht & Kilchling, supra note 34, at 29. See also Uniting Against Terrorism, supra 
note 206, ¶ 5. 
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laying the foundation for a unified financial approach against global 
terrorism. While their success thus far has been measured at best, 
they have nevertheless created further opportunity to build upon this 
foundation. 
IV. BUILDING UPON THIS FOUNDATION: 
INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL JUDGMENTS 
As demonstrated above, the international community shares a 
strong commitment to fight terrorism in its myriad manifestations. In 
view of the common goal of drying up the financial means for 
terrorism, the international community should build upon this 
commitment. The time is ripe to take this civil battle to the next level, 
to strengthen and expand. This proposal entails a three-pronged 
approach: 
First, the Security Council should increase its enforcement of 
members’ efforts to freeze assets overseas. The committees should 
continue their work to mandate, monitor, and ensure member state 
compliance with all components of their resolutions against global 
terrorism. Fresh from the recent unified summit, the new “UN Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy” affords a unique opportunity to do so.  
Logically this coordinated effort will need to include under its 
framework increased sharing of information, improved 
communication, and streamlined technological systems.228 Some 
clarification of court jurisdiction will also be necessary in order to 
give individuals whose names have been placed on the list a forum 
and means of challenging this designation in particular cases.229 This 
work can be augmented through strong statements and additional UN 
resolutions as necessary. 
 
 228. See Noble, supra note 185; Rosand, supra note 169, at 752; McCoy, supra note 146 
(identifying these needs). 
 229. Such a court could exercise a reviewing function over these challenges as both a check 
on the powers of the executive branch in unilaterally making these designations and a protector 
of the rights of persons whose assets have been frozen, albeit with appropriate deference. For a 
discussion of these concerns, see supra notes 180-182 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Swede 
Removed From Terror Suspect List, THE SOMALILAND TIMES, Aug. 17, 2006, available at 
http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/2005/239/24.shtml (discussing United States removal of 
Ahmed Yusuf, a Somali-born Swedish man, from its list of people suspected of links to 
terrorism, almost five years after he was placed on the terror suspects list and had his assets 
frozen; his attempts to challenge this designation had failed due to a lack of a court with clear 
jurisdiction, a lack of information sharing, and a strong deference to the U.S. list); see also 
Swede Loses EU Terror Link Case, THE LOCAL (Swed.), Sept. 21, 2005, available at 
http://www.thelocal.se/article.php?ID=2132&date=20050921. 
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Second, the national courts of member states should commit to 
the enforcement of the civil judgments of U.S. courts for the victims 
of terrorism, levying upon the assets of organizations connected to 
terrorism wherever they may be found. Overall, the enforcement of 
U.S. judgments at the outset would not be against the public policy of 
the international community. To the contrary, the universally adopted 
UN resolutions demonstrate that the guiding principles have already 
been recognized. Punitive damages and treble damages may be 
problematic in some nations, but problematic portions of a judgment 
could be severed by international courts from the enforceability of 
the main portion of the judgments.230 At the very least, the main 
component of the victim’s compensatory award should be honored 
since national courts worldwide hold common belief in reciprocity, 
comity, and the rule of law. 
Finally, international courts should exercise concurrent 
jurisdiction in these matters, enabled by their potential access to the 
frozen assets of terrorist organizations. They should provide terrorism 
victims with access to frozen assets obtained through UN 
resolutions.231 Indeed, the 1566 Working Group of the Security 
Council already appears to be exploring an international 
compensation fund for the victims, which could be comprised of 
money seized from terrorist organizations and their supporters.232 
Perhaps it will provide an independent avenue for victims of 
international terrorism to pursue civil lawsuits against terrorist groups 
and state sponsors of terrorism in international courts. In order to be 
an effective cause of action, such an approach would need to offer a 
 
 230. As a general fundamental principle of construction, if a statute or contract contains a 
part that is invalid, unconstitutional, or against public policy and the invalid part may be 
severable from the rest, that invalid part should be stricken while the portion which is 
constitutional or unobjectionable may stand and be upheld by the court. See, e.g., Hankins v. 
Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 109 (2d Cir. 2006) remanded to 516 F. Supp. 2d 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(severability rule applied to Religious Freedom Restoration Act); SKF USA Inc. v. United 
States, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1365 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006) remanded to 502 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 2007) (citing El Paso & Ne. Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 96 (1909) which stated, 
“[W]henever an act of Congress contains unobjectionable provisions separable from those 
found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of this court to so declare, and to maintain the act in 
so far as it is valid.”). See generally 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law §§ 207-11 (2008) 
(explaining the effect and treatment of partial constitutionality, including tests for determining 
severability). 
 231. See, e.g., Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322, 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 28 U.S.C.), discussed supra notes 66-68 
and accompanying text. 
 232. See S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 215, ¶ 10. 
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forum, broad jurisdiction, and an enforcement mechanism for these 
civil suits. Certainly these UN resolutions provide evidence that 
enforcing U.S. judgments abroad would be consistent with the public 
policy of the UN, member nations, and international courts on the 
same basis. The civil approach thus carries favorable implications for 
the judiciary worldwide; together the international community can 
employ the courts to prove the old adage that “the pen is mightier 
than the sword.”233 
CONCLUSION 
Historically the UN Security Council has done its job of 
promoting international security and peace through non-military 
measures, particularly with the freezing of terrorist assets as an 
important alternative to military combat for thwarting terrorism. 
Scholars have conducted research and concluded that, in comparison 
to attempts to employ direct preventative or reactive tactics, financial 
methods are more effective at garnering intelligence and curbing 
terrorism. The UN Security Council has supported economic 
alternatives to war, such as freezing terrorist assets, for managing 
international conflicts and promoting long-term, global peace.  
Together with their strong enabling language, these resolutions 
provide the foundation for a unified international economic initiative 
against terrorism. 
As revealed by the closer examination above, the policy of 
freezing assets as an attempt to combat terrorism is not currently 
viable as the sole alternative to the use of military force. To be sure, 
the blocking of funds is a helpful but not an exhaustive method by 
which to continue the struggle against terrorists and the organizations 
that support them. Until globalization and the restructuring of the 
information world is complete, further actions will be necessary to 
provide security to the international community. In order for the 
international community to successfully combat terrorism, a 
multilateral approach is necessary. Strict enforcement of resolutions 
accented by the seizure of financial assets and the use of the 
 
 233. This expression was coined in its current form by Edward Bulwer-Lytton in 1839 for his 
play, Richelieu; Or the Conspiracy: A Play in Five Acts (1839), although he was not the first to 
use a phrase with this concept.  One of those preceding Bulwer-Lytton was Thomas Jefferson, 
who in 1796 sent a letter to Thomas Paine in which he wrote: “Go on doing with your pen what 
in other times was done with the sword.” See Origins of Sayings, www.trivia-
library.com/b/origins-of-sayings-the-pen-is-mightier-than-the-sword.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 
2008). 
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international judicial system is the most effective, logical and realistic 
approach. 
The progress to date is just the beginning. At this time of 
tremendous unity and potential opportunity, UN resolutions must be 
strengthened to increase the freezing of terrorist assets overseas and 
give access to those assets to victims seeking to enforce judgments 
against terrorist groups and state sponsors of terrorism. The United 
States has supported civil lawsuits by enacting federal statutory 
authority both for the claims and for the execution of judgments 
against terrorists and their supporters. As an increasing number of 
these lawsuits proceeds successfully through the U.S. courts, and as 
Congress develops new legislation, such as the Justice for Victims of 
Terrorism Act, the international community will be called upon to aid 
these plaintiffs in collecting money judgments. This can be achieved 
by recognizing that the strong statements and mandates in key 
Security Council resolutions embody a unified public policy in 
support of the financial approach to fighting terrorism. Accordingly, 
individual nations should enforce these judgments through their 
courts where the terrorists’ assets, including frozen assets, are located; 
and furthermore, route frozen assets of the international community 
to international courts for enforcement. In addition, the international 
community can choose to follow this model and provide an avenue 
for victims of global terrorism directly to pursue civil lawsuits against 
terrorist groups and organizations in the international courts. 
The road to collection is a long and arduous one, fraught with 
obstacles and frustrations ahead, but endorsing a civil action 
approach is a significant start. Judith C. Young, the mother of Marine 
Sgt. Jeffrey Young who was killed in the 1983 Beirut bombing of the 
Marine barracks, recently commented on the passage of the new U.S. 
law: 
The bells of justice now ring more loudly. We have said to state 
sponsors of terror: The life-blood of the terrorist, the money that 
buys their weapons, gives them food and shelter, and pays for their 
training and travel, will be harder to obtain. The cost of all this 
support has just gotten hundreds and even thousands of times more 
expensive . . .  State sponsors of terror now know they must pay for 
their actions.234 
Both the U.S. Congress’ enactment of terrorist-related statutes and 
UN resolutions aimed at impeding terrorists and freezing their assets 
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have laid the foundation to provide victims of terrorism with a forum 
for that accountability. 
When civil monetary damages carry weight beyond national 
boundaries, the international community reaches common ground: 
nations recognize the legitimacy of courts in the international sphere; 
they provide reparation to the victims of terrorism; and they 
dismantle terrorist infrastructure. As Dwight D. Eisenhower advised, 
[T]his peace we seek cannot be born of fear alone: it must be 
rooted in the lives of nations. There must be justice, sensed and 
shared by all peoples, for, without justice the world can know only a 
tense and unstable truce. There must be law, steadily invoked and 
respected by all nations, for without law, the world promises only 
such meager justice as the pity of the strong upon the weak.235 
In conclusion, it is only through the active role of the UN and other 
organizations, including the courts worldwide, that the international 
community can bring to fruition this struggle to reclaim the world 
from the clutches of terrorism. 
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